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abstract
Reaching some form of consensus is often necessary for autonomous
agents that want to coordinate their actions or otherwise engage in
joint activities. One way to reach a consensus is by aggregating individ-
ual information, such as decisions, beliefs, preferences and constraints.
Judgment aggregation is a social choice method, which generalises vot-
ing, that studies the aggregation of individual judgments regarding the
truth-value of logically related propositions. As such, judgment aggre-
gation is applicable for consensus reaching problems in multi agent
systems. As other social choice theory, judgment aggregation research
is abundant with impossibility results. However, the aim of this tuto-
rial is to give an introduction to the methods of judgment aggregation,
not the impossibility results. In particular, the tutorial will introduce
the basic frameworks that model judgment aggregation problems and
give an overview of the judgment aggregation functions so far devel-
oped as well as their social theoretic and computational complexity
properties. The focus of the tutorial are consensus reaching problems
in multi agent systems that can be modelled as judgment aggregation
problems. The desirable properties of a judgment aggregation method
applied to these problems are not necessarily the same as properties
desirable in legal or political contexts, which is considered to be the
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native domain of judgment aggregation. After this tutorial the partic-
ipants are expected to be able to read and understand judgment ag-
gregation literature and have a grasp on the state-of-the-art and open
questions in judgment aggregation research of interest to multi agent
systems.
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1 introduction
Social choice theory [1] is concerned with transforming individual de-
cision into collective ones. As a research area it spans mathematics,
economics, political science, philosophy, and as of recently, computer
science. The interest for social science in computer science stems from
the modern development of the computer science field itself. One of
the characteristics of modern computer science is an increased distribu-
tivity both of computation and information, but also the increase of
intelligence and autonomy of computational entities. Past passive web
pages are increasingly becoming intelligent trackers of behaviour and
extractors of information from the visitors. Intelligent agents gather
information from various sources and dynamically construct prices
for services. These are all situations in which intelligent autonomous
agents would need to make collective decisions and merge informa-
tion, which can be modelled as well known social choice theory prob-
lems. This gave rise to a new interdisciplinary field of research – com-
putational social choice [2].
The goal of this document is to acquaint students and researchers
that work in computer science, and multi agent systems in particu-
lar, with a lesser known area of social choice - judgment aggregation.
Judgment aggregation is an abstract aggregation framework in which
many complex collective decision problems can be modelled and it is
based on a logic framework, making it somewhat more natural choice
for a social choice method used in multi agent systems. We aim to
acquaint the readers with the state of the art in judgment aggregation
enabling them to independently follow the literature in judgment ag-
gregation and perhaps pursue some of the numerous open problems
in this field.
1.1 What are social choice problems
In most democracies elections are held at regular intervals to select
members of parliaments, presidents, prime ministers and various other
representatives and leaders. This is the perhaps the best known exam-
ple of social choice problems, the problems of voting and preference
aggregation. The legitimacy of the elected representative is based on
confidence in the fairness of the procedure that is used to aggregate
the individual votes in the electorate. A fair and overall good aggrega-
tion procedure is one that selects winners in lines with what each of
the agents in the electorate prefers. We give an overview of preference
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aggregation and voting in Section 5.1. Much of social choice theory
is concerned with study of aggregation procedures - designing good
procedures and analysing their properties.
Social choice methods are not limited to voting problems. Another
well known social choice problem is matching: each from one group
agents needs to be paired off with someone from a second group of
agents based on preferences. For example consider a list of candidates
for residency positions in hospitals and a list of hospitals. Each hos-
pital has a preference over which resident it would like to hire, while
each resident has a preference over for which hospital she would like
to work. The problem of finding a match such that no two agents
would preferred to be matched with each other rather than with the
agents with which they are already matched is known as the stable
marriage problem.
Well known social choice problems with established applicability
in multi agent systems are the resource allocation problem [3]. Given
a set of goods, that can be divisible, indivisible, or both, and a set
of agents each with different preferences over (combinations of) the
goods, we need to find a way to divide the goods so that no agent
would rather have someone else’s allocation. This is the envy-free
resource allocation problem.
Judgment aggregation is the problem of finding collective answers to
a set of questions. The questions, or issues admit binary answer, "yes"
and "no", or alternatively "true" or "false". The questions are such that
an answer to some questions constraints the answers that can be given
to others; we typically say that the issues are logically interrelated. The
problem is to find a function that aggregates sets of answers, called
judgment sets into a logically consistent, but also representative, collec-
tive set of answers.
1.2 Social choice terminology
We now introduce some basic terminology used when discussing so-
cial choice and social choice problems.
On a general abstract level, a social choice problem is the problem
of combining individual decisions into a representative collective de-
cision. The individual decisions are combined by applying an aggre-
gation function, or an aggregator, to them. The term representative is
intuitively equated with majority supported or plurality supported - the
collective decision is surely representative if it coincides with the ma-
jority of the individual decisions, or with the plurality of theme. A
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decision is supported by a majority if out of n individuals more than
n
2 support it. A decision is supported by a plurality if there are more
individual supporting this decision then any other.
However, representative does not only mean majority supported.
Furthermore, a collective choice by some majoritarian aggregator, even
if appealing but not always possible for many reasons. Different ideas
of what a good aggregator is or is not have been floated in the liter-
ature throughout the history. Social choice theory aims to axiomatise
these concepts and study them formally.
We can often find mentions of characterisation results in social choice
theory. This term refers to works in which a list of aggregator prop-
erties are considered together and shown that there exists precisely
one aggregator that simultaneously satisfies them. Another frequently
used term is impossibility result. This term refers to theorems which
show that no aggregator can simultaneously satisfy a particular list of
aggregator properties. The most famous of the impossibility results is
that of Kenneth Arrow [4] regarding preference aggregation. Arrow
shows that a very small set of some rather simple properties cannot be
simultaneously satisfied by an aggregator of preferences.
What impossibility results actually show is that an ideally represen-
tative, or fair, or democratic collective decision maybe does not exist
for every social choice problem. However, this does not mean that
no aggregation is possible, rather it means that too many options for
aggregating individual decisions are available. Since each aggregator
may identify a different collective decision, which aggregator is best
for a given aggregation problem is also within the scope of interest for
social choice theory.
1.3 Short history of judgment aggregation
We give the short history of the judgment aggregation as a research
field. Short because the history of judgment aggregation is short, par-
ticularly when compared with that of other problems such as the
aggregation of votes. The origins of aggregating collections of bi-
nary answers can be found in [5, 6]. These works consider sets of
allowed lists (of fixed length) of binary evaluations. An example of
a list of binary evaluations of length three is (1, 0, 0). It is shown
that aggregating a collection of lists from the allowed set, for example
〈(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (1, 1, 1)〉 does not necessarily yield a list of evaluations
from the allowed set.
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It is widely considered [7] that interest in the field was sparked by
the papers on how collective decisions are made by collegiate courts
[8, 9]. A court needs to not only make a verdict but also justify that
verdict with reasons, based on the low. How the reasons determine
the verdict is set out by the legal doctrine, or in plain terms "the law".
Korhauser and Sager [8, 9] use examples from legal cases to show
that the direction in which the verdict is reached can influence which
verdict is reached. We give an example of the problem they consider.
The verdict the each judge needs to make is
‘Do you (the judge) rule for the plaintiff?’.
Each judge must rule in favour of the plaintiff when there was both
a contract and a breach of contract, otherwise the judge must rule for
the defendant (and against the plaintiff). So effectively the judges also
nee to make a judgment regarding two issues:
‘Are you convinced there is a contract between the plaintiff and the
defendant?’
‘Are you convinced the defendant breached the contract?’.
A problem arrises on how to reach a verdict when:
the first judge believes there was a contract but no breach of contract
and thus rules for the defendant,
the second judge believes there was no contract, but should there
had been one it would have been breached, thus rules for the
defendant,
the third judge rules for the plaintiff since she is convinced there was
both a contract and a breach of contract.
If the judges first look at the reasons for the verdict, they find that 2 out
of 3 judges believe there was a contract and 2 out of 3 judges believe
there was a breach of contract. The collective decision on the reasons
implies that the court should rule in favour of the plaintiff. However, 2
out of 3 judges individually have ruled for the defendant, therefore the
court should rule in favour of the defendant. Much of the literature on
this topic in legal theory is concerned with identifying when the the
judges should base their verdict on individual opinions regarding the
reasons and when directly on individual verdicts [10].
Judgment aggregation took its present form when the aggregation
problem was modelled using propositional logic to represent the issues
on which individual answers are given. The purpose of using logic
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representation is to explicitly represent the logic relations between the
issues of interest and be able to check the consistency of the combina-
tions of answers.
It was shown that aggregating judgments is a different problem than
generalises aggregating preferences [11]. Judgment aggregation is also
subject to impossibility results, the kind that Arrow proved for prefer-
ence aggregation problems, [12]. The first decade of judgment aggre-
gation yielded many impossibility results, comprehensive overview of
which can be found in e.g., [7, 13]. The properties used in attaining
impossibility results are heavily inspired by those used for the same
purpose in preference aggregation.
While much attention was devoted to showing that the perfect judg-
ment aggregator cannot exist, very little actual aggregators have been
developed until very recently [14] and even less non-preference aggregation-
inspired properties of aggregators have been studied. One of the rea-
son for this state of affairs can be found in the abstractness of the
framework - it is not obvious what are the natural judgment aggre-
gation examples. Outside of collegiate courts, people seem to avoid
dealing with complex collective decisions and reasoning about them.
In comparison voting is very cognitively simple and intuitive. Instead
of stating their opinions and then aggregating them people seem to
prefer to talk things over until a consensus is reached one way or an-
other, not necessarily by fair and democratic means [15]. Intelligent
artificial agents however are not yet capable of taking collective deci-
sion shortcuts.
Although we devote an entire section to the judgment aggregation
for multi agent systems, we would like to briefly mention here the
place that judgment aggregation can have as a tool for collective deci-
sion making for agents. When a collective decision is mentioned, the
intuitive mental image that arises is one of people on a round table
attempting to reach an agreement. Agents that cooperate would need
to make collective decisions about what to believe, which goal to pur-
sue, which plan to jointly choose, how to divide tasks and revenues
between them etc. Although making agreements is one application for
judgment aggregators it is not the only one.
Artificial agents would need to combine information from various
sources to form their beliefs about the world or other agents. This
is a form of learning about the world. For example an agent should
recommend "Lord of the Rings" as a movie to watch to a user if the user
is older than thirteen, has watched at least two other fantasy movies
and has not expressed dislike of the "Lord of the Rings" books. The
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information about the age, movie preferences and book preferences of
the user may come from various different sources on the web and may
contradict each other.
A strong shortcoming of judgment aggregation is that we have at
present sufficient results [16, 17, 18] to be sure that the problem of ag-
gregating judgments is computationally expensive. This should not be
taken as a discouragement. Many logic reasoning problems are com-
putationally expensive, nonetheless optimisation methods have been
found. Designing efficient judgment aggregators is still an open terri-
tory in judgment aggregation research.
1.4 Beyond these lecture notes
The goal of these lecture notes is to give a comprehensive introduction
to judgment aggregation and our focus is on specific judgment aggre-
gators and their properties. The list of aggregators and properties is
very small and almost none of the aggregators have been characterised.
Although the field of judgment aggregation is small, it was still not
possible to cover all of it within this document.
The complexity theoretic analysis of various aspects of the judgment
aggregators is very much in the scope of interest of computational so-
cial choice. We have results regarding almost all judgment aggregators
at present and we can direct the reader towards e.g., [16, 17, 18], which
also contain references to further work in this area. After covering
this course and with some background in complexity theory a reader
should be able to independently follow the literature.
One area of research involving judgment aggregation and falling
within the scope of multi agent systems is the use of judgment aggre-
gation in abstract argumentation [19]. Works in this area include, but
are not limited to [20, 21, 22, 23]. To follow these works the reader is
expected to have some background in abstract argumentation theory.
The assumed background for these lecture notes is basic understand-
ing of classical propositional logic. We start with introducing the two
most popular frameworks for judgment aggregation. No agreement
on notation exists in the literature, with each group of researchers de-
vising their own, but the concepts used remain the same. We make an
attempt to give numerous examples and intuitive insights which may
at time detract from mathematical rigour.
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2 aggregation frameworks
We begin by introducing the framework, or rather frameworks, for
judgment aggregation. Several judgment aggregation frameworks have
been proposed in the literature. The two arguably most frequently
used are the propositional logic framework and the binary framework.
It is common in the literature to use the term judgment aggregation
when studying aggregation problems in the propositional logic frame-
work and binary aggregation when studying aggregation problems in
the binary framework. We predominantly use the logic framework
within the scope of this document, but introduce both to help high-
light the differences and equip the reader to follow with ease all sci-
entific articles within the judgment aggregation discipline. The choice
between the two frameworks is a matter of convenience and personal
preference for a particular research problem and personal preference.
It was shown in [24] that the two frameworks are equally expressive
and only slightly differ in terms of succinctness of representation. In
this section we introduce both the propositional logic framework and
the binary framework and briefly discuss the relations between them.
For completeness, we also discuss and give references to other frame-
works for judgment aggregation.
2.1 Propositional logic framework
The propositional logic framework for judgment aggregation is used
extensively in judgment aggregation works in economics and political
science such as [11, 12, 25, 26, 27], as well as in artificial intelligence
such as [13, 14] and [2, Chapter 17]. This framework utilises a set
of well formed formulas of propositional logic Lp. The propositional
logic framework is built around the representation of an issue as a
pair1 of formulas {ϕ,¬ϕ} ⊂ Lp. Now, making a judgment on an issue
equates to making a choice between the two formulas ϕ and ¬ϕ. A
judgment aggregation problem is a tuple of 〈A, Γ ,P〉, where A ⊂ Lp
is an agenda2 of issues, Γ ⊂ Lp is a set of constraints, and P is a profile
of judgments that is a list (an ordered multi-set) of judgment sets. We
define the rest of the concepts.
1 Frequently we refer just to the non negated formula ϕ as issue.
2 In the literature the letters Φ and X are also is used for the agenda. We reserve Φ
for agendas in the binary framework and use A to distinguish the agendas in the logic
framework.
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2.1.1 Judgment aggregation problem
agenda An agenda A = {ϕ1,¬ϕ1, . . . ,ϕm,¬ϕm} is a finite set of
issues {ϕi,¬ϕi} ⊂ Lp. The issues in the agenda may be literals, but
also more complex propositional formulas. Given an agenda A, the pre-
agenda A+ associated with it3 is the set of the non-negated formulas
from A, namely A+ = {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕm}. It is assumed that the formulas
in the pre-agenda are satisfiable, namely they are neither tautologies,
nor contradictions. An agenda subset As ⊆ A is a subset of issues in
A such that necessarily if ϕ ∈ As, then ¬ϕ ∈ As.
The agenda represents all the issues on which binary collective de-
cisions need to be made. Within the propositional logic framework,
the issues can be formulas, not only atoms, the logic relations between
such issues can be captured already in the agenda, as illustrated by the
following example, slightly modified from the example in [7].
Example 1. Let the atom p denote the proposition "Current CO2 emis-
sions lead to global warming". Let the formula (p∧ r) → q denote
the proposition "If current CO2 emissions lead to global warming and
global warming will be disastrous for humanity, then we should re-
duce CO2 emissions". Lastly let the atom q denote the proposition "We
should reduce CO2 emissions". The agenda formed of these three is-
sues is
A = {p,¬p, (p∧ r) → q,¬((p∧ r) → q),q,¬q}. The pre-agenda for
this agenda is A+ = {p, (p ∧ r) → q,q}. The atom r, which clearly
denotes the proposition "Global warming will be disastrous for hu-
manity" is not explicitly considered an issue in the agenda, since the
statement it represents is a common assumption and requires no judg-
ment. Nonetheless it is included in the formula representing the sec-
ond agenda issue to make the assumption explicit in determining a
judgment for this issue.
In addition to implicitly expressing logic relations among the agenda
issues by using non-atomic formulas, the judgment aggregation prob-
lem can have explicitly mandated agenda issue relations, or constraints.
constraints Given a set of formulas S ⊂ Lp, let Atoms(S) be the
set of all propositional variables that occur in a formula in S. The set
of constraints for an agenda A is a given nonempty set Γ ⊂ Lp ∪ {>}
such that Atoms(A) ∩ Atoms(Γ) 6= ∅ and if ϕ ∈ A, then ϕ 6∈ Γ and
¬ϕ 6∈ Γ . It is assumed that the formulas in Γ are satisfiable and that Γ
is a consistent set of formulas.
3 For the pre-agenda the notation [A] is sometimes used in the literature.
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The condition Atoms(A)∩Atoms(Γ) 6= ∅ ensures that the constraints
are relevant to the agenda, while the condition if ϕ ∈ A, then ϕ 6∈ Γ
and ¬ϕ 6∈ Γ ensures that judgments can be cast for issues in the agenda.
If either ϕ ∈ Γ or ¬ϕ ∈ Γ , the issue {ϕ,¬ϕ} is already resolved.
The constraints ensure that certain combination of judgments cannot
be made concurrently for issues in the constrained agenda. The case
when no constraints are specified is represented with Γ = {>}. The
difference between non-atomic formulas in the agenda and constraints
is illustrated in Example 2.
Example 2. Consider two pre-agendas A+1 = {p,p → q,q} with con-
straints Γ1 = {>} and A+2 = {p,q} with constraints Γ2 = {p→ q}. When
giving judgments on the first agenda, the agents can choose whether
the relation p→ q holds between p and q – the relation between issues
is an issue itself. When giving judgments on the second agenda how-
ever, p→ q has to hold. Thus a combination of judgments p and ¬q is
allowed for judgments on the first agenda, but not on the second.
In the propositional logic framework, the decision-makers, or agents,
express their judgments on a given agenda, respecting relevant given
constraints for that agenda. The input from each individual agent is a
judgment set.
judgment set. A judgment set is an agenda subset J ⊂ A. A judg-
ment set is complete for an agenda A if it contains a judgment for every
issue in A, or in other words, for every ϕ ∈ A+, either ϕ ∈ J or ¬ϕ ∈ J.
A judgment set is consistent if it is a consistent set of classical logic
formulas and it is consistent with the constraints Γ , namely J ∪ Γ 2 ⊥,
where |= is the classical logic consequence operator. A judgment set is
rational if and only if it is consistent and complete, of course all with
respect to given A and Γ .
In general, a subset of the agenda S ⊂ A is inconsistent if S ∪ Γ |= ⊥.
A set S is a consistent subset of the agenda if and only of it is not an
inconsistent subset of the agenda. The set S is a minimally inconsistent
subset of the agenda if it is an inconsistent subset of the agenda and
for all S ′ ⊂ S, S ′ is a consistent subset of the agenda. Namely S is
minimally inconsistent if it can be made consistent by adding any one
element from the agenda.
In a judgment aggregation problem, the agents are asked to give
their judgment sets for an agenda A and associated constraints Γ . Typ-
ically, the agents are allowed to only contribute complete and consis-
tent judgment sets. For a given agenda A and associated constraints Γ
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we can construct the set of all complete and consistent judgment sets.
Within the scope of this document, we will call this set the codomain.
codomain. Given an agenda A and associated constraints Γ , the
codomain J(A, Γ) is the set of all complete and consistent judgment
sets that can be constructed for A and Γ .
We will sometimes need to refer to the set of all consistent, but in-
complete, judgments for an agenda A and associated constraints Γ . We
denote this set with J(A, Γ). Clearly J(A, Γ) ⊂ J(A, Γ). As a convention,
we adopt that the empty set is in J(A, Γ).
Although it would not be very succinct in general to do so, a judg-
ment aggregation problem can also be represented as a pair of codomain
and profile, namely 〈J(A, Γ),P〉.
Example 3. Consider again the pre-agenda A+ = {p, (p∧ r)→ q,q} and
two possible constraints Γ1 = {>} and Γ2 = {r}. We obtain the following
codomains.
J(A, Γ1) =

{p, (p∧ r)→ q,q},
{p, (p∧ r)→ q,¬q},
{p,¬
(
(p∧ r)→ q),¬q},
{¬p, (p∧ r)→ q,q},
{¬p,¬
(
(p∧ r)→ q),q}

J(A, Γ2) =

{p, (p∧ r)→ q,q},
{p,¬
(
(p∧ r)→ q),¬q},
{¬p, (p∧ r)→ q,q},
{¬p, (p∧ r)→ q,¬q},

The last element of the judgment aggregation problem is the profile
of judgments. The profile is nothing but a collection of judgment sets,
one representing each decision-maker or agent.
profile. Consider an agenda A and associated constraints Γ . Given
a set of n agents, each represented with a judgment set Ji ∈ J(A, Γ),
a profile P is a list P ∈ J(A, Γ)n, P = (J1, . . . , Jn). We slightly abuse
notation and use Ji ∈ P to denote that Ji is agent i’s judgment set in P.
Within the scope of this document, we use subscripts to denote judg-
ment sets that are associated with an agent, thus Ji is a judgment set
that represents agent i. We use superscript to denote judgment sets in
the codomain.
The next example is an instance of the "doctrinal paradox" judgment
aggregation problem.
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Example 4. The "doctrinal paradox" judgment aggregation problem is
the problem of deciding whether a defendant is liable or not (guilty or
innocent) with respect to a case of breached contract. The following is-
sues are considered: p representing "a contract exist between the plain-
tive and the defendant", q representing "the defendant had breached
the contract (assuming one existed)" , and d representing "the defen-
dant is liable for a breach of contract with the plaintive". The legal
doctrine stipulates the following constraint (p∧q)↔ d that represents
that the defendant is liable for a breach of contract if and only if a con-
tract existed and that contract was breached. Thus the pre-agenda is
A+ = {p,q,d} and the set of constraints is Γ = {(p∧ q)↔ d}. Now we
can determine the codomain
J(A, Γ) = {{p,q,d}, {p,¬q,¬d}, {¬p,q,¬d}, {¬p,¬q,¬d}}. The profile of
the "doctrinal paradox" judgment aggregation problem is
P = ({p,q,d}, {p,¬q,¬d}, {¬p,q,¬d}).
Various operations on profiles can be defined. We give the defini-
tions of ones that we will use most often within this document.
2.1.2 Operations on profiles
The number N(ϕ,P), is the number of times a judgment ϕ ∈ A is
endorsed in a profile P ∈ J(A, Γ)n. Formally N(ϕ,P) = #{i | ϕ ∈
Ji, Ji ∈ P}. Clearly N(ϕ,P) > 0 and N(ϕ,P) 6 n. If N(ϕ,P) = n
for some ϕ ∈ A, then we say that there is a unanimity on ϕ in P.
If N(ϕ,P) = n for every ϕ ∈ A, then we say that P is a unanimous
profile. For a unanimous profile P there exists a judgment set
J ∈ J(A, Γ) such that for every i, 1 6 i 6 n, it holds Ji = J. This
judgment set J is called the unanimity judgment.
The partial profile P↓AS is defined for a profile P ∈ J(A, Γ)n, P =
(J1, . . . , Jn) and an agenda subset AS ⊆ A as follows
P↓AS = (J1 ∩AS, . . . , Jn ∩AS).
A partial profile P↓AS is obtained from a profile P when in each
judgment set Ji in P, the judgments that are not elements of AS
are removed from Ji. We give an example.
Example 5. Consider again "doctrinal paradox" problem given in
Example 4. Let AS = {p,¬p,d,¬d} and let P be the judgment
profile in this example. For the partial profile P↓AS we have
P↓AS = ({p,d}, {p,¬d}, {¬p,¬d}).
Visually, the partial profile P↓AS . See Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Visualising partial profiles.
The sum of profiles P1 and P2 where P1 ∈ J(A, Γ)n1 , P1 = (J1, . . . , Jn1)
and P2 ∈ J(A, Γ)n2 , P2 = (J ′1, . . . , J ′n2) is a profile P = P1 + P2,
such that P ∈ J(A, Γ)n, where n = n1+n2 and P = (J1, . . . , Jn1 , J ′1, . . . , J ′n2).
The operators v, and u we define for profiles in the following way.
• For two profiles P1 ∈ J(A, Γ)n1 and P2 ∈ J(A, Γ)n2 , where
n1 6 n2, it holds that P1 v P2 if and only if every agent
that is in P1 is also in P2.
• Given two profiles P1 ∈ J(A, Γ)n1 and P2 ∈ J(A, Γ)n2 , for
profile P ∈ J(A, Γ)n, where n 6 min(n1,n2), it holds P =
P1 u P2 if and only if P contains all the agents, and only
these agents, that are both in P1 and in P2.
Example 6. Consider the pre-agenda A+ = {p,p ∧ q, r ∨ s} and
Γ = {q→ r}. We have that
J(A, Γ) =

Ja = {¬p,p∧ q,¬(r∨ s)},
Jb = {¬p,p∧ q, r∨ s},
Jc = {p,¬(p∧ q),¬(r∨ s)},
Jd = {p,¬(p∧ q), r∨ s},
Je = {p,p∧ q, r∨ s}

Let P1 = (Ja, Jb, Ja, Je) and P2 = (Jb, Ja). We have that P1 + P2 =
(Ja, Jb, Ja, Je, Jb, Ja) and it holds that P2 v P1.
We conclude this section by introducing various properties of the
agenda that occur in the literature, including here the definition of
special types of agendas.
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2.1.3 Agenda properties
We start with the premises - conclusions agenda, which is the type of
agenda we find in the "doctrinal paradox" example. The judgment
aggregation problem can sometimes be given as a tuple 〈Ap,Ac, Γ ,P〉,
where Ap is an agenda of premises and Ac is an agenda of conclu-
sions. Necessary Ap ∩Ac = ∅ and the agenda is actually the union of
the Ap and Ac. The judgments on the issues that are premises serve
as explanations for the judgments on the issues of the conclusion. In
the "doctrinal paradox" example, Ap = {p,¬p,q,¬q} and Ac = {d,¬d}.
Some aggregation problems naturally give rise to a premises - conclu-
sions agenda and as we shall see later on, some judgment aggregation
functions are applicable only to these types of judgment aggregation
problems.
Given an agenda, we cannot test, we cannot determine whether it is
a premises - conclusions agenda. A premises - conclusions agenda has
to be specified as such in the specification of the judgment aggregation
problem. The next agenda properties we define can be identified for
any agenda.
It has to be emphasised that most of these properties have been
defined only for the aggregation problems in which the agenda is not
associated with constraints, i.e., Γ = {>}. We extend the definitions
here to include any Γ . This extension is straightforward and intuitive
when the consistency of S ⊂ A is defined as S∪ Γ 2 ⊥.
An agenda is closed under propositional variables [27] when
Atoms(A) ⊆ A. For example, the agenda in Example 4 is closed
under propositional variables, while the agenda Example 1 is not
closed under propositional variables, since the variable r does
not occur as an issue in the agenda. The agenda we give in Ex-
ample 7 later is also not closed under propositional variables.
An agenda satisfies non-simplicity [13] if and only if there exists a
subset S ⊆ A of at least three elements, i.e., |S| > 3, that is a
minimally inconsistent subset of A. An agenda is simple otherwise.
Observe that the reason why |S| > 3 is that any agenda has a
minimally inconsistent subset of size two because every issue is
a minimally inconsistent subset of size two. If an agenda does
not satisfy non-simplicity, we say it is simple. In [17] the term
median property is used. The median property is synonymous
with agenda simplicity i.e., an agenda is simple if and only if it
satisfies the median property.
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An agenda satisfies the k-median property [17] if and only if every in-
consistent subset of A has itself an inconsistent subset of size at
most k, where k > 2. Clearly for k = 2, the agenda is simple, so
the 2-median property is the median property, while for k = 1, is
not possible since any set of one formula is consistent.
To define when an agenda is path-connected [28], also called totally-
blocked in [29], we first define conditional entailment between two
judgments in an agenda.
Let ϕ,ψ ∈ A. We say that ϕ conditionally entails ψ, written
ϕ `∗ ψ if {ϕ} ∪ S |= {ψ} for some S ⊂ A that is a consistent
agenda subset which is consistent with ϕ and consistent with
¬ψ. Furthermore, we write ϕ ``∗ ψ if there is a sequence of
judgments {ϕi, . . . ϕk} ∈ A such that ϕ = ϕi `∗ · · · `∗ ϕk = ψ.
Thus ``∗ is the transitive closure of `∗.
An agenda is path-connected [28] if for any two judgments ϕ,ψ ∈
A it holds ϕ ``∗ ψ. Intuitively, an agenda is path-connected
when the judgment on each issue is a logic consequence of the
judgment of some other issues in the agenda.
Example 7. An example of an agenda that is not path-connected is
the agenda A = {p∧ r,¬(p∧ r),p∧ s,¬(p∧ s),q,¬q,p∧q,¬(p∧
q), t,¬t} introduced in [14]. In this agenda t, and respectively ¬t,
is not conditionally independent on any agenda subset that does
not include this judgment.
We now define two separability properties of the agenda. A partition
{A1,A2} of agenda A is an independent partition of A [30] if for
every two judgment sets J1 ∈ J(A1, Γ) and J2 ∈ J(A2, Γ), J1∪ J2 is
a consistent and complete judgment set from J(A1, Γ). If Γ = >, a
partition {A1,A2} of agenda A is a syntactical independent partition
of A [30] if and only if Atoms(A1) ∩ Atoms(A2) = ∅. Clearly,
a syntactical independent partition of A is also a independent
partition of A.
2.2 Binary framework
The binary framework is frequently used in judgment aggregation
works in artificial intelligence such as [31, 32, 33], but also in economics
[34]. The core difference between the binary and the logic aggrega-
tion frameworks is how a judgment is represented. Intuitively in both
framework a judgment is an answer to a binary question, which we
call "issue". In the logic framework a judgment is a binary answer to a
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single issue represented as a logic formula or a negated logic formula.
In the binary framework a judgment is an answer to all the issues in
the agenda, which here are only allowed to be propositional variables,
represented as a truth-value assignment function.
A judgment aggregation problem in the binary framework is a tuple
〈Φ, IC,B〉, where Φ is an agenda of issues, IC is a set of associated
constraints for Φ, which are also called integrity constraints and B is a
profile of judgments. We define each of the components.
agenda. An agenda Φ = {p1, . . . ,pm} is a set of propositional vari-
ables, i.e., Φ ⊂ Lv, where Lv is a set of propositional variables.
(integrity) constraints. Let Lw be a set of well formed proposi-
tional logic formulas of propositional variables from Lv and the logic
connectives ¬, ∧, ∨,→, and↔. The integrity constraints for an agenda
Φ = {p1, . . . ,pm} is a set of formulas IC ⊂ Lw such that Atoms(IC) ∩
Φ 6= ∅. It is assumed that Φ is satisfiable. The set Mod(IC) ∈ {0, 1}m
is a set of models for IC if and only if every one of its elements is a
truthful assignment for IC for the classical logic sense.
Example 8. Let Φ = {p1,p2,p3,p4,p5} and IC = {((p1 ∨ p2)∧ p3) →
p4,p4 → p3}. The set of all models for IC is
Mod(IC) =

(1, 1, 1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1, 1, 0), (1, 1, 0, 0, 1), (1, 1, 0, 0, 0),
(1, 0, 1, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0, 0, 0),
(0, 1, 1, 1, 1), (0, 1, 1, 1, 0), (0, 1, 0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0, 0, 0),
(0, 0, 1, 1, 1), (0, 0, 1, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1, 0, 1), (0, 0, 1, 0, 0),
(0, 0, 0, 0, 1), (0, 0, 0, 0, 0)

The difference between the logic and binary frameworks emerges in
the representation of judgments.
judgment. Given an agenda Φ = {p1, . . . ,pm}, a judgment for Φ,
also called a a ballot [33], is a vector B ∈ {0, 1}m that has an assignment
of either 0 or 1 for each agenda issue, 0 indicating a disagreement with
or a negative answer to the issue and 1 indicating an agreement or a
positive answer to the issue. A judgment B is rational for an agenda
Φ and associated constrains IC, when B ∈ Mod(IC), namely when j
is a truthful assignment for IC. We use B(p) to denote the truth-value
assigned to p ∈ Φ in B.
Note that in the binary framework, a judgment is a vector of length
m = |Φ| populated with values 0 and 1. It is by definition complete in
the sense that it has one truth-value assignment for each agenda issue.
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In the logical aggregation, a judgment is a set of cardinality m = |A+|.
The set Mod(IC) in the binary framework thus plays the same role
as the codomain set in the logic framework. In general, regardless
of framework, judgments that are complete and consistent are called
rational judgments.
As in the logic framework, here too a judgment profile is a list of
rational judgments, one representing each from a list of agents.
profile. Consider an agenda Φ and associated constraints IC. A
profile B is a list of n agents, each represented with a rational judgment
Bi ∈ Mod(IC). Thus B ∈ Mod(IC)n. We slightly abuse notation and
use Bi ∈ B to denote that Bi is agent i’s judgment set in B.
In the binary framework, again, we can also define the judgment
aggregation problem as a pair 〈Mod(IC),B〉, but this is in general not
a succinct representation when the set Mod(IC) has many elements.
agenda properties. The agenda properties can be considered in
the binary framework, with some rewriting of the definitions to in-
clude the integrity constraints, which we already did. Of course, premise-
conclusion agendas can be specified here as well.
2.3 Relations between frameworks
The binary and the logic framework are equally expressive, as shown
by Proposition 1 in [24]. This relationship between the two frameworks
is directly observable as it is relatively straightforward to transform
judgment aggregation problems from one framework to the other.
As argued in [24], the agenda and integrity constraints in the bi-
nary aggregation framework can be seen as a special case of agenda
and constraints in the logic aggregation framework. Thus every binary
judgment aggregation problem is a logic judgment aggregation prob-
lem. As an illustration consider the "doctrinal paradox" Example 4.
The transformation from a problem in the logic to a problem in the
binary framework is not as direct, but it is easy to see how it can
be done. Given a logic framework agenda A, a binary framework
agenda Φ can be obtained by assigning a new propositional variable
to represent each element in A+. The same rewriting can be directly
applied to the elements of Γ . The integrity constraints would now
contain the rewritten Γ and also a set of constraints describing the
relation between the agenda items in Φ making them equivalent to the
relations between issues in A.
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This problem transformation processed is precisely how the agenda
and integrity constraints in Example 8 were obtained from the agenda
and constraints Γ (which recall were Γ = {>}) in Example 7. More
precisely p1 ≡ (p∧ r), p2 ≡ (p∧ s), p3 ≡ q, p4 ≡ (p∧ q) and p5 ≡
t. Observe that there exists an isomorphism between Mod(IC) and
J(A, Γ). For every J ∈ J(A, Γ) there is a corresponding B ∈ Mod(IC)
(and vice versa) such that for every ϕ ∈ A+ and corresponding p ∈ Φ
that represent it, ϕ ∈ J if and only if B(p) = 1 or ¬ϕ ∈ J if and
only if B(p) = 0. An example of such pair is a judgment set J =
{¬(p∧ r),¬(p∧ s),q,¬(p∧ q), t} and judgment B = (0, 0, 1, 0, 1). As
shown by Proposition 9 in [24], the algorithm for transforming any
A and Γ into corresponding Φ and IC, in the worst case, runs in a
non-deterministic polynomial time.
By Theorem 6 in [24] it is shown that the logic aggregation frame-
work is strictly more succinct than the binary aggregation frameworks,
under the common assumption that the polynomial hierarchy does not
collapse (P 6= NP). This means that representing a judgment aggrega-
tion problem in the logic framework requires less computational space
than representing the same problem in the binary framework. How-
ever, in [24] it is also shown the difficulty of finding result from the
aggregation of the profile, for the known judgment aggregation func-
tions, in both frameworks remains the same. We discuss aggregation
functions at length in Chapter 3. Next we make a brief overview of,
and giver references to, other judgment aggregation frameworks that
appear in the literature.
Lastly we must mention the framework used by Nehring, Pivato,
and Puppe [35, 36] who work with a binary framework, but have 1
and −1 as values assigned to issues instead of 1 and 0. Most of the
other definitions they use in their model correspond to the definitions
in the binary aggregation framework.
2.4 Other frameworks
Outside of artificial intelligence, exploring other-than-classical logic
frameworks had been primarily motivated by the search for
(im)possibility results, i.e., sets of properties that no judgment aggre-
gation function can satisfy at the same time, rather than by the search
of elegant modelling of various judgment aggregation problems.
In [37] a general logic framework for judgment aggregation was
studied. For this general logic, which is (afore most) monotonic, non
para-consistent and compact, the (im)possibility results already shown
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in the literature, such as those shown in [12], persist. Most relevant
perhaps from the view-point of multi agent systems is that the gen-
eral logic of [37] includes all two-valued monotonic logics such as the
description logics and the modal logics, as well as some of the multi-
valued logics. Not subsumed by the general logic in [37] is the multi-
valued logic framework considered [38] in (also for work regarding
im)possibility results) built over the multi-valued Post logic [39] and
three-valued Łukasiewicz logic [40] studied in [41].
Some judgment aggregation work has been done with frameworks
built upon three-valued logics. In [42] a ternary-logic framework was
proposed for design of aggregation functions, further specified for the
Kleeny logic and the Łukasiewicz logic [40].
Multi-valued logic frameworks are of interest when the agents are
allowed to express other judgments regarding an agenda issue except
agreement and disagreement. To allow the agents to abstain on an
issue, we need to use a three-valued logic to model related judgment
aggregation problems. The semantics of the used three-valued logics
will capture the precise meaning of an abstention on an issue. Choos-
ing the right three-valued logic semantics only appears to be trivial.
We will illustrate this observation with an example from experiments
described in [43].
Consider a robot that needs to determine whether she has heard a
sound. The robot has a reasoning rule which says that proposition Bϕ,
denoting a "I believe there was a sound", is evaluated to true if a collec-
tion of input samplings from the robot’s microphone averages above a
certain decibel threshold. The same rule assigns a value "false" to Bϕ
when the microphone input averages bellow the threshold. It is unre-
alistic to require that the robot would always be able to evaluate Bϕ
either to true or to false. One reason that the robot may fail to do so
is an average decibel value of microphone sound samples that falls ex-
actly on the threshold. Another reason is that the robot’s microphone
is damaged or otherwise out of commission. In both these cases the
robot will need to abstain regarding the issue Bϕ, however the useful-
ness of these abstentions is not the same. In the first case, the robot’s
abstention in a judgment profile contributes valuable information that
needs to be taken into consideration when aggregating the profile. In
the second case, the abstention as information should be disregarded
when the profile is aggregated.
In the case of multi-valued judgments, the frameworks representing
judgments as value functions offer an intuitive way to model judgment
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aggregation problems, while this is not the case with frameworks that
represents judgments as formulas.
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3 judgment aggregators
The primary aim of judgment aggregation research is the design and
analysis of aggregation functions, or aggregators. A solution to a judg-
ment aggregation problem is a set of judgments, also called collective
judgment set that are most-representative of the profile given in the prob-
lem, but also a complete and consistent judgment set. A judgment
aggregation function maps a profile of judgments to such a collective
judgment set. Depending on how the concept of "most-representative"
is defined, various judgment aggregation functions can be defined. In
voting theory, voting methods have been defined and discussed since
the 18th century, and many specific methods are available. In judg-
ment aggregation, comparatively few aggregators have been defined,
almost all within the past decade. We present almost all known aggre-
gators in this section, in historical order.
Recall:
• N(ϕ,P) is the number of agents in P that have selected ϕ ∈ A in
their judgment set, i.e., the number of agents in the profile that
support ϕ,
• J(A, Γ) is the set of all consistent, but possibly incomplete, judg-
ment sets for A and Γ including the ∅, while
• J(A, Γ) ⊂ J(A, Γ) is the set of all complete and consistent judg-
ment sets for A and Γ .
• Given a subagenda AS, a partial profile for it of profile P is
P↓AS = (J1 ∩AS, . . . , Jn ∩AS)
3.1 Types of aggregators
Let 〈A, Γ ,P〉 be any judgment aggregation problem, where P is a profile
of a finite number of n agents with J(A, Γ) the codomain set. Given a
set S ⊆ J(A, Γ), we use P∗(S) to denote the power set of S excluding
the empty set. Recall that a judgment set is rational if and only if it is
complete and consistent for A and Γ .
A judgment aggregation function F : S→ P∗(J(A, Γ)), or aggregator,
is a function that maps a set of rational judgment sets to a judgment
profile from S ⊆ J(A, Γ)n. If F(P) is a singleton for every P ∈ S, then
F is called a resolute aggregator, otherwise, we say that F is an irresolute
aggregator. When F is defined for S = J(A, Γ)n, then we say that F
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satisfies universal domain. If F is defined only for some S ⊂ J(A, Γ)n,
then we say that F is a partial aggregator.
When judgment aggregation is used as a collective decision-making
method, it is clearly best to use resolute aggregators that satisfy uni-
versal domain. However, as shown by numerous impossibility results4,
such as the ones in [12], have shown that either universal domain
or resoluteness needs to be "sacrificed". Since it most domains, one
cannot reasonably guarantee that a profile will always be of a certain
kind, universal domain is deemed more important than resoluteness.
Although most properties have been defined for resolute aggregators,
due to legacy reasons we discuss in more detail in Chapter 4, most
specific judgment aggregation functions defined are irresolute.
The first aggregators defined in the literature were resolute, but did
not satisfy universal domain. In the next section we present this first
class of aggregators.
Before we proceed, it is be useful to have the tools to compare aggre-
gators. We define what it means for one aggregator to refine another
and for two aggregators to be different.
An aggregator F1 refines an aggregator F2, denoted F1 ⊆ F2 if and
only if, for every P ∈ J(A, Γ)n it holds that F1(P) ⊆ F2(P).
Two aggregators F1 and F2 are the same, denoted F1 = F2, if and
only if F1 ⊆ F2 and F2 ⊆ F1.
Two aggregators F1 and F2 are different, denoted F1 6= F2 if and only
if neither F1 refines F2, nor F2 refines F1. Or in other words, F1 6= F2
if and only if there exists a profile P ∈ J(A, Γ)n and a judgment sets
J, J ′ ∈ J(A, Γ) such that J ∈ F1(P), J 6∈ F2(P), J ′ ∈ F2(P), J ′ 6∈ F1(P).
Intuitively, an aggregator F1 refines F2 when the collective judg-
ments produced by F1 are always a selection from the collective judg-
ments produced by F2. For two aggregators to be considered different,
there should be at least one profile on which they give different collec-
tive judgments.
In the rest of this section A is an agenda of issues in the logic frame-
work, A+ = {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕm} the respective pre-agenda, Γ a set of asso-
ciated constraints and P ∈ J(A, Γ)n, P = {J1, . . . , Jn} is a profile of
judgments.
4 For a thorough and comprehensive overview of impossibility results we point the reader
to [13].
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3.2 Partial-aggregators
We begin by defining the quintessential partial aggregator the issue-
by-issue majority function m which is defined as the set of judgments
supported by a strict majority in P or formally:
m(P) = {ϕ | ϕ ∈ A,N(ϕ,P) > n
2
} (1)
We call m(P) the majoritarian set. It is easy to observe that m(P)
would not always be a complete set of judgments, particularly when
the number of agents in the profile is even. A bit less obvious is that
m(P) is not always a consistent judgment set, although all the agents
in the profile have rational judgment sets. We illustrate this "paradox"
with two examples given in Tables 1 and 2. The first row of the tables
lists the elements of the pre-agenda. The second row of the tables
presents the associated constraints. Each subsequent row represents
an agent Ji, with "+" under the corresponding judgment ϕ if and only
if ϕ ∈ Ji and "−" when ¬ϕ ∈ Ji. The last row of the tables contains
the respective majoritarian set.
In Table 1, the first and second rows of the table give the pre-agenda
and associated constraints of the "doctrinal paradox" example given
in Example 4, while in Table tab:scw, the first two rows contain the
pre-agenda and associated constraints from Example 7.
Agents { p, q, d}
Γ = {d↔ (p∧ q)}
J1 + + +
J2 + - -
J3 - + -
m(P) + + -Table 1: Judgment aggregation problem for Example 4.
Agents { p∧ r, p∧ s, q, p∧ q, t }
Γ = {>}
J1 − J6 + + + + +
J7 − J10 + + - - +
J11 − J17 - - + - -
m(P) + + + - +Table 2: Judgment aggregation problem for Example 7.
The issue-by-issue majority function m() is an example of a partial
aggregator – it is only defined for some profiles, which we will call
majority-consistent profiles. The function m() we will also call the major-
ity aggregator Formally P ∈ J(A, Γ) is majority-consistent if and only if
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m(P) is a consistent judgments set, which may or may not be complete
for A.
To deal with consistent but incomplete judgment set, which define
the function ext : J(A, Γ) → P∗(J(A, Γ)) that returns all possible exten-
sions of an incomplete but consistent judgment set into complete and
consistent judgment sets.
ext(J) = {J ′ | J ′ ∈ J(A, Γ), J ⊂ J ′} (2)
3.2.1 Premise-based procedure
The first aggregators that were considered, already in the works of Ko-
rnhauser and Sager [8, 9] were defined for the special type of premise-
conclusions agenda, building upon the majority aggregator. These
were the premise-based procedure PBP and the conclusion-based procedure
CBP. We define them both here.
LetA = Ap∪Ac be an agenda partitioned in sub-agendas of premises
Ap and sub-agenda of conclusions. The premise based procedure first
applies issue-by-issue majority to aggregate the judgments on the is-
sues in Ap and then uses this partial majoritarian set of premises to-
gether with the constraints to deduce the judgments on the issues from
Ac, or alternatively we extend the incomplete judgment set of premises
using the ext function.
The conclusion based procedure always produces incomplete collec-
tive judgment sets, as it applies the issue-by-issue majority only on the
profile of conclusions. Whereas this is perhaps sufficient in law, it is un-
acceptable for solving general judgment aggregation problems, which
is why the conclusion based procedure has been unexplored. An ex-
ception is [44] where a method for "completing" the conclusion-based
procedure was proposed, which we will come back to in Section 3.6.
We illustrate the premise-based procedure and the conclusion-based
procedure on the "doctrinal paradox" example.
Example 9. Let Ap = {p,¬p,q,¬q}, Ac = {d,¬d} and Γ = {d ↔ (p∧
q)}. Consider the profile for this agenda and constraints. Using the
premise-based procedure In the "doctrinal paradox" example, for the P
given in Table 1, we first aggregate the judgments on the premises and
obtain m(P↓Ap) = {p,q}. We can now use the classical consequence
operator |= and obtain that PBP(P) = {p,q,d}.
Applying the conclusion based procedure on this profile P means
applying issue-by-issue majority on the profile of conclusions, thus
CBP(P) = m(P↓Ap) = {¬d}.
judgment aggregators 31
Formally, the premise-based procedure can be defined as follows:
PBP(P) = ext(m(P↓Ap)). (3)
The premise-based procedure is a very simple and intuitive way to
aggregate judgments. However, it is not without shortcomings. For
one, it is limited to agendas that can be partitioned into premises
and conclusions, and this is not feasible for every judgment aggre-
gation problem. Furthermore, and it is not difficult to observe this, the
premise-based procedure does not always return singleton sets. If, for
example, the agenda is not totally-blocked and there exists an issue
in the conclusions whose judgment cannot be deduced by judgments
on the premises, the PBP will not be resolute. The premise-based pro-
cedure is one of the best studied procedures in the literature. An de-
tailed analysis of the properties of this procedure can be found in [45].
As to the question of deciding whether an agenda is such that the
premise-based procedure is resolute, [46] show that this problem is
computationally not easy.
3.2.2 Uniform quota rules
Last in this collection of aggregators we present the quota rule. The
quota rule is a generalisation of the issue-by-issue majority. Instead of
requiring that a judgment should have the support of majority in order
to be included in the collective judgment set, the quota rule changes
the threshold, i.e., the quota from n2 to a value 0 < k 6 n. If the same
threshold is used for each issue in the agenda, then the quote rule is
called the uniform quota rule. Formally, the uniform quota rule UQk is
defined as
UQk(P) = {ϕ | ϕ ∈ A,N(ϕ,P) > k}, where 0 < k 6 n is given. (4)
The uniform quota rules are one of the best explored judgment ag-
gregation rules in the literature, starting with [47] that analyse their
social theoretic properties. In [17] their computational theoretic prop-
erties were explore, more precisely, how difficult it is to determine
whether the agenda is such that the uniform quota rule returns a sin-
gle rational judgment set. The highlight of these results, with respect
to this document, is identifying that UQk "behaves well" when the
agenda satisfies the the k-median property (Theorem 12 in [17]). Some
of the other works that study the uniform quota rules and quota rules
in general are [48, 49, 50].
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We should lastly mention the special uniform quota arrgregator,
called issue-by-issue unanimity, defined for k = n where n is the num-
ber of agents in the aggregated profile. This function is simply defined,
for P ∈ J(A, Γ)n as
u(P) = {ϕ | ϕ ∈ A,N(ϕ,P) = n}. (5)
3.3 Majority-preserving aggregators
The next collection of functions we consider are the what we call
majority-preserving aggregators. The basic idea behind these aggrega-
tors is that the majoritarian set is the "ideal" collective judgment set
for a profile and when this set is not consistent we should look for
ways of minimally "adjusting" the profile so that it becomes majority-
consistent. Based on how these "adjustments" are operationalised, dif-
ferent aggregators are obtained. A through analysis of the majority-
preserving aggregators can be found in [14]. We start with defining
majority-preservation as a property of aggregators and then present a
list of such operators, using the names used in [14]. The reader should
be aware that since different groups of researchers arrived at the same
aggregators virtually simultaneously, often different names are used
for the same aggregator.
Intuitively an aggregator is majority-preserving if it always returns
the extensions of m(P) whenever this majoritarian set is consistent.
We need the extensions of the majoritarian set since this set may not
be complete. We give a formal definition
An aggregator F is majority-preserving if and only if, for every P
such that m(P) ∈ J(A, Γ) F(P) = ext(m(P)).
3.3.1 Maximum Condorcet rule (mc)
We start with the maximum Condorcet rule (mc) since many of the subse-
quent aggregators we introduce are a refinement of this rule. The mc
aggregator operationalises the profile "adjustment" by trying to use
as many of the majority supported judgments in the majoritarian set
as possible. Thus the mc aggregator basically returns the maximally
consistent subset of m(P), with respect to set inclusion.
Given a set of formulas S ⊂ A, the maximally consistent subset of S
with respect to set inclusion, is a set S ′ ⊆ S such that there exists no
other consistent agenda subset S ′′ that is a superset of S ′, i.e., S ′ ⊂
S ′′ ⊆ S. The set max(S,⊆) is the set of of all maximally consistent
subsets of S with respect to set inclusion.
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Consider for example the profile given on Table 2. For this profile P
we have that m(P) = {{p∧ r,p∧ s,q,¬(p∧ q), t}. This majoritarian set
is not a consistent agenda subset. The set max(m(P),⊆) contains the
following sets: {p∧ r,p∧ s,q, t}, {p∧ r,p∧ s,¬(p∧q), t} and {q,¬(p∧
q), t}.
An intuitive way to think about the max(m(P),⊆) sets is to look
at the profile as a table, see Table 3 for example. To obtain a sets
max(m(P),⊆) we are looking for a minimal number of columns in the
table to "ignore" (other than the first column of course) so that m(P)
becomes consistent. But, we want to be "fair", so for each "consistent"
combination of columns there should be a set in which that column is
not "ignored". So by ignoring the fifth column (just cover it with a strip
of paper as an exercise), we obtain the first consistent subset of m(P).
By ignoring the fourth column, we obtain the second consistent subset
of m(P). However, we have now either "ignored" either the fourth or
the fifth column, although they support judgments that are consistent
together, {q,¬(p ∧ q)} is a consistent agenda subset. If we want to
"give these columns a chance" we have to ignore the second and third
column. This is how the last set in max(m(P),⊆) is obtained.
Agents { p∧ r, p∧ s, q, p∧ q, t }
Γ = {>}
J1 − J6 + + + + +
J7 − J10 + + - - +
J11 − J17 - - + - -
m(P) + + + - +
max(m(P),⊆) + + + +
+ + - +
+ - +Table 3: Maximally consistent subsets of m(P), agenda from Example 7.
The mc aggregator is obtained by simply extending the sets inmax(m(P),⊆)
to complete sets using the ext function:
mc(P) = {ext(J) | J ∈ max(m(P),⊆)}. (6)
3.3.2 Maxcard Condorcet rule (mcc)
Note that the set {p,¬(p ∧ q), t} in max(m(P),⊆) uses less majority
supported judgments than the other sets in max(m(P),⊆). The next
aggregator, the maxcard Condorcet rule (mcc), is obtained by refining
mc(P), taking only those elements from max(m(P),⊆) to extend that
are of maximal cardinality.
Given a set of formulas S ⊂ A, the maximally consistent subset of S
with respect to set cardinality, is a set S ′ that is a consistent a consistent
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agenda subset and for which there exists no other consistent agenda
subset set S ′′ ⊆ S such that |S ′′| > |S ′|. The set max((, |.|)S) is the set
of all maximally consistent subsets of S with respect to set cardinality.
Now we can define the mcc aggregator.
mcc(P) = {ext(J) | J ∈ max(m(P), |.|)}. (7)
Example 10. For the profile given in Table 2, agenda and constraints
given in Example 7 we obtain:
mc(P) =

{p∧ r,p∧ s,q,p∧ q, t},
{p∧ r,p∧ s,¬q,¬(p∧ q), t},
{¬(p∧ r),¬(p∧ s),q,¬(p∧ q), t}

mcc(P) =
{
{p∧ r,p∧ s,q,p∧ q, t},
{p∧ r,p∧ s,¬q,¬(p∧ q), t}}
}
In [14] it was shown that mcc ⊆ mc. The output of the aggrega-
tor mc is called Condorcet admissible set by Nehring et al. [51], while
mcc is called Slater rule [51]. It is also a special case of the Endpoint
aggregator defined in [52].
The next aggregator we present is also refines mc, however not in
such a obvious way as mcc. This aggregator is called ranked agenda rule
(ra).
3.3.3 Ranked agenda rule (ra)
Instead of just looking at the elements of the majoritarian set, we can
also consider how much support each judgment obtained in the pro-
file. Intuitively, the ra constructs the collective judgment set by adding
in it judgments one by one, starting with the judgment that has the
"strongest support" in the profile, i.e., for which N(ϕ,P) is highest.
A judgment is only added if it is consistent (with respect to the con-
straints as well) with the judgments already added. Let us run this
procedure with the profile given in Table 2.
We start with an empty collective judgment set J = ∅. For the profile
in Table 2, the judgment with the strongest support in the profile is
q which appears in 13 of the 17 judgment sets. So now J = {q}. The
judgment ¬(p∧ q) has the next strongest support with 11 of the 17
judgment sets containing it. Since ¬(p ∧ q) is consistent with q we
now have J = {¬(p∧q),q}. The judgments p∧ r, p∧ s and t each have
the support of 10 judgment sets. However, only t can be added to J,
since adding either p∧ r, or p∧ swould cause J to become inconsistent.
Now J = {¬(p ∧ q),q, t}. The next judgments to be considered are
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¬(p∧ r), or ¬(p∧ s) which each have the support of 7 judgment sets.
Adding these two to J completes the collective judgment set and now
ra(P) = {{¬(p∧ q),q, t,¬(p∧ r),¬(p∧ s)}}.
However, ra is not a resolute operator. Sometimes, a choice has to
be made on which of two judgments with the same support should
be added to the collective judgment set. Each time this happens the
collective judgment set "forks" into as many judgment sets as options,
one judgment set for each option. To illustrate this case we give an
example from [14].
Example 11. Consider the pre-agenda A+ = {p∧ q,p,q,p∧ r,q∧ r, s}
and constraints Γ = {>}. Let P be a profile for this agenda be as given
in Table 4.
Voters p∧ q p q p∧ r q∧ r s
Γ = {>}
J1 − J5 - + - + - +
J6 − J10 - - + - + -
J11 − J14 + + + + + +
J15 + + + - - -
m(P) - + + + + +Table 4: A profile from [14] showing that ra is not resolute.
Table 5 gives the support that each judgment has in this profile in
descending order (left to right, top to bottom).
Judgment ϕ ¬(p∧ q) p q p∧ r q∧ r s
N(ϕ,P) 10 10 10 9 9 9
Judgment ϕ ¬(p∧ r) ¬(q∧ r) ¬s p∧ q ¬p ¬q
N(ϕ,P) 6 6 6 5 5 5Table 5: The support of each judgment in the profile of Table 4.
Following the procedure, we should add ¬(p∧ q), p and q to the
collective judgment, but this is not possible since this set of three judg-
ments is not consistent. We must create three collective judgment sets,
one for each judgment: J1 = {¬(p∧ q)}, J2 = {p} and J3 = {q}. We
proceed "filling" each of these three judgment sets in parallel. Figure 2
illustrates each step of this process for each starting judgment set.
We now have
ra(P) =

{p∧ q,p,q,p∧ r,q∧ r, s},
{¬(p∧ q),p,¬q,p∧ r,¬(q∧ r), s},
{¬(p∧ q),¬p,q,¬(p∧ r),q∧ r, s}}

Formally the ra rule is defined in [14] in the following way.
Let A = {ψ1, . . . ,ψ2m}. For every profile P ∈ J(A, Γ)n, ra consists
of those judgment sets J ∈ J(A, Γ) for which there exists a permuta-
tion (ϕ1,ϕ2, . . . ,ϕ2m) of the propositions in A such that N(P,ϕ1) >
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J1
{¬(p ∧ q)}
{¬(p ∧ q), p} {¬(p ∧ q), q}
{¬(p ∧ q), p, p ∧ r, s} {¬(p ∧ q), q, q ∧ r, s}
{¬(p ∧ q), p, p ∧ r, s,¬(q ∧ r)} {¬(p ∧ q), q, q ∧ r, s,¬(p ∧ r)}
{¬(p ∧ q), p, p ∧ r, s,¬(q ∧ r)}
J2
{p}
{¬(p ∧ q), p} {p, q}
{¬(p ∧ q), p, p ∧ r, s} {p, q, p ∧ r, q ∧ r, s}
{p, q, p ∧ r, q ∧ r, s, p ∧ q}
J3
{q}
{¬(p ∧ q), q}{p, q}
{p, q, p ∧ r, q ∧ r, s}
{p, q, p ∧ r, q ∧ r, s, p ∧ q}
{¬(p ∧ q), q, q ∧ r, s}
{¬(p ∧ q), q, q ∧ r, s,¬(p ∧ r)}
Figure 2: Creating the collective judgment sets by ra(P) for P of Table 4.
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N(P,ϕ2) > · · · > N(P,ϕ2m) and J is obtained by the following algo-
rithmic procedure:
S := ∅
for k = 1, . . . , 2m do
if S∪ {ϕk} is consistent then S← S∪ {ϕk}
end if
end for
J := S
The formal proof that the ra aggregator is a refinement of the mc
aggregator is given in [14]. To gain an intuitive insight into why this is
so, consider again the little trick with "ignoring" columns of the profile
table we did before.Here again we can see the operation of the ra
aggregator as "ignoring" issue columns, but now we "play favourites":
we start by ignoring all the columns, and then we "let them in" one
by one, preferring the most "popular" judgments and "letting in" the
others that are not in conflict with the ones that are already in. The ra
aggregator behaves sort of like a bouncer at a night club.
The ra aggregator has its own refinement. The aggregator we con-
sider next, the leximax rule defined in [53, 54] refines the ra aggrega-
tor, the formal proof of this relationship is also given in [14].
3.3.4 The leximax rule
The leximax rule again considers the support a judgment has in the
profile and is very similar to the ra aggregator, to the point that they
are sometimes mistakenly considered to be the same. To use the same
analogy as before, the leximax bouncer is more picky than the ra
bouncer: if a set of judgments have the same support in a profile, but
is inconsistent, it lets in first those judgments that have a more popu-
lar posey, or in logic-speak consistent with more majority supported
judgments.
Let us look at again the judgment aggregation problem from Ex-
ample 11. Observe that if we start constructing a collective judgment
set by adding either p or q first, we can next add all the majority-
supported judgments except ¬(p∧q). If instead, we start constructing
a collective judgment set with ¬(p∧q), we see that two of the majority-
supported judgments cannot be added. The leximax rule further se-
lects from the output of the ra aggregator, those collective judgment
sets that contain a maximal number of majority-supported judgments.
This leximax(P) = {{p∧ q,p,q,p∧ r,q∧ r, s}} for the profile P from
Example 11.
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Since we use the same framework as the one used in [14], we give
almost verbatim the formal definition of leximax from there.
Given a profile P ∈ J(A, Γ)n and a judgment set J ∈ J(A, Γ), define
Sk(P) = {ϕ ∈ A | N(P,ϕ) = k, n2 6 k 6 n} and sk(J,P) = |Sk(P) ∩ J|.
Given two rational judgment sets J, J ′, let J >leximaxP J
′ if and only if
there is a k ∈ {n2 , . . . ,n} such that sk(J,P) > sk(J ′,P) and for all i > k,
si(J,P) = si(J ′,P). leximax(P) is the set of all undominated rational
judgment sets in with respect to >leximaxP .
3.3.5 The median rule (med)
We consider the last aggregator that refines mc know in the literature
at present. This is aggregator was defined under many names and in
many different ways by various authors. Here, we use for it the name
median rule (med). This aggregator is a special type of the Prototype
aggregator defined in [52], median rule [51], maximum weighted agenda
rule [55], simple scoring rule [26] and distance-based procedure [17]. Vari-
ants of this rule have been defined by Konieczny and Pino-Pérez [56]
and Pigozzi [57].
As the ra aggregator, the med aggregator also considers the number
of agents that have ϕ in their judgment set when choosing which judg-
ments to include in the collective judgment set. Instead of sequentially
considering the agenda judgments one by one in order of strength
of support, the med aggregator assigns a value to each judgment set
J ∈ J(A, Γ), based on the number N(ϕ,P) of each ϕ ∈ J. The collective
judgment sets according to the med aggregator are those with assigned
highest value. We illustrate this process with an example.
Example 12. Consider the judgment profile given in Table 2, for the
agenda and constraints given in Example 7. Table 6 gives the N(ϕ,P)
values for each ϕ ∈ A; the first two rows belong to the majority-
supported judgments.
Judgment ϕ p∧ r p∧ s q ¬(p∧ q) t
N(ϕ,P) 10 10 13 11 10
Judgment ϕ ¬(p∧ r) ¬(p∧ s) ¬q p∧ q ¬t
N(ϕ,P) 7 7 4 6 7Table 6: The support of each judgment in the profile of Table 2.
Table 7 gives the values for each J ∈ J(A, Γ); the first row belonging
to a J ∈ J(A, Γ) and the second to its value.
The judgment set with the highest value assigned is {p∧ r,p∧ s,q,p∧
q, t}, thus med(P) = {{p∧ r,p∧ s,q,p∧ q, t}}.
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J Value
{p∧ r,p∧ s,q,p∧ q, t} 49
{p∧ r,p∧ s,q,p∧ q,¬t} 46
{p∧ r,p∧ s,¬q,¬(p∧ q), t} 45
{p∧ r,p∧ s,¬q,¬(p∧ q),¬t} 42
{¬(p∧ r),¬(p∧ s),q,¬(p∧ q), t} 48
{¬(p∧ r),¬(p∧ s),q,¬(p∧ q),¬t} 46
{¬(p∧ r),¬(p∧ s),q,p∧ q, t} 43
{¬(p∧ r),¬(p∧ s),q,p∧ q,¬t} 40
{p∧ r,¬(p∧ s),q,p∧ q, t} 46
{p∧ r,¬(p∧ s),q,p∧ q,¬t} 43
{¬(p∧ r),p∧ s,q,p∧ q, t} 46
{¬(p∧ r),p∧ s,q,p∧ q,¬t} 43
{¬(p∧ r),p∧ s,¬q,¬(p∧ q), t} 42
{¬(p∧ r),p∧ s,¬q,¬(p∧ q),¬t} 39
{p∧ r,¬(p∧ s),¬q,¬(p∧ q), t} 42
{p∧ r,¬(p∧ s),¬q,¬(p∧ q),¬t} 39
{¬(p∧ r),¬(p∧ s),¬q,¬(p∧ q), t} 39
{¬(p∧ r),¬(p∧ s),¬q,¬(p∧ q),¬t} 36Table 7: The value of each judgment in the codomain for the profile of Table 2.
Despite this example, the med aggregator is not resolute. It is not
difficult to imagine that there will be profiles for which two judgments
in J(A, Γ) will be assigned the same, and maximal, values.
We now give the formal definition of the med aggregator, as stated
in [14].
med(P) = argmax
J∈J(A,Γ)
∑
ϕ∈J
N(ϕ,P). (8)
Of all the aggregators that refine mc, the med does so perhaps in
the most unintuitive of ways. For a formal proof that t med ⊆ mc,
the reader is advised to consult [55] or [14]. To intuitively grasp why
med ⊆ mc is the case, observe first that the majoritarian set will always
have the highest value assigned with respect to a profile, even if the
majoritarian set is not rational. The rational judgment sets with maxi-
mal assigned values have to be those that include as many as possible
of the majority-supported judgments, i.e., the set with the maximal
value must be among the extensions of the maximally consistent sub-
sets of the majoritarian set, with respect to set inclusion.
The med aggregator is the last of the aggregators in the literature,
that we are aware of, that refines mc.
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3.3.6 The Young rule (y)
Not all majority-preserving aggregators are a refinement of mc. Re-
call the analogy of "minimally changing" the profile by choosing to
"ignore" some issue columns in the table representation of a profile.
What if we "minimally change" the profile by ignoring rows in the ta-
ble representation of the profile instead? This is how we obtain the
Young rule (y), or aggregator. The y aggregator was defined in [55] and
further studied in [14]
Intuitively, the Young rule looks for a smallest number of agents to
remove from the profile so that the new, smaller profile is majority-
consistent. We illustrate this process with an example from [14].
Example 13. Consider the judgment profile given in Table 2, for the
agenda and constraints given in Example 7. This profile is majority-
inconsistent. Removing just one, any one, agent still gives a majority-
inconsistent profile. Removing any combination of two agents also
yields a majority-inconsistent profile. The smallest number of agents to
remove to "gain" majority-
consistency for this profile is three. There are many ways to remove
three agents from this profile to get a majority consistent profile. We
enlist all possible combinations and resulting profiles in Tables 8, 9, 10 and 11.
Agents { p∧ r, p∧ s, q, p∧ q, t }
Γ = {>}
J1 − J3 + + + + +
J7 − J10 + + - - +
J11 − J17 - - + - -
m(P’) + -Table 8: Profile resulting from removing any three of J1 − J6 in the P from
Example 7.
Agents { p∧ r, p∧ s, q, p∧ q, t }
Γ = {>}
J1 − J4 + + + + +
J7 − J9 + + - - +
J11 − J17 - - + - -
m(P”) + -Table 9: Profile resulting from removing any two agents from the J1− J6 group
and any one agent from the J7 − J10 group in the P from Example 7.
The extensions of m(P ′), m(P ′′),m(P ′′′) and m(P ′′′), which happen
to be the same set for this profile, are all consistent but not complete.
To obtain the collective judgment sets assigned by y, we extend them
using the ext function. Thus
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Agents { p∧ r, p∧ s, q, p∧ q, t }
Γ = {>}
J1 − J5 + + + + +
J7 − J8 + + - - +
J11 − J17 - - + - -
m(P”’) + -Table 10: Profile resulting from removing any one agents from the J1 − J6
group and any two agents from the J7 − J10 group in the P from
Example 7.
Agents { p∧ r, p∧ s, q, p∧ q, t }
Γ = {>}
J1 − J6 + + + + +
J7 + + - - +
J11 − J17 - - + - -
m(P””) + -Table 11: Profile resulting from removing any three agents from the J7 − J10
group in the P from Example 7.
y(P) = ext({q,¬(p∧q)}) =
{
{¬(p∧ r), ¬(p∧ s), q, ¬(p∧ q), t},
{¬(p∧ r), ¬(p∧ s), q, ¬(p∧ q), ¬t}
}
.
In the case of Example 13 all four different reduced profiles have
the same majoritarian set, but in this need not be the case for every
judgment aggregation problem. The majoritarian sets we obtain from
the reduced profiles in Example 13 are consistent agenda subsets but
not necessarily complete. Thus before outputting them as collective
judgment sets, the Young aggregator needs to complete them using
the ext function. Following is the formal definition of the young rule
as it appears in [14].
y(P) = {ext(m(Q)) | Q ∈ argmax
QvP,
m(Q)∈J(A,Γ)
|Q|}. (9)
The same profile that we used as a running example, the profile
given in Table 2, for the agenda and constraints given in Example 7,
shows that y 6= mc.
The aggregators we presented so far were majority-preserving in an
obvious way. They were individual aggregators designed by looking
for minimal parts of the profile to "ignore". Next we look into classes
of aggregators. Some of them are majority-preserving, but most are
not.
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3.4 Value aggregators
When we explained the med aggregator we established that this aggre-
gator "operates" by assigning values to each rational judgment set in
J(A, Γ) and choosing the highest valued sets for collective. The classes
of aggregators we consider now are built by expanding this idea of
assigning values. The scoring judgment aggregators are built around
the idea that values are assigned to individual judgments in a rational
judgment set. The distance-based aggregators directly extend the core
aggregation principle of the med aggregator – values are assigned to
rational judgment sets. Lastly, the rationalising aggregators "operate" by
assigning values to entire profiles that have the same number of agents
as the aggregated P. We start with presenting the distance-based class.
3.4.1 Distance-based aggregators
The class of distance-based aggregators includes the med aggregator
and this is its best known member. The value that we assign to each
J ∈ J(A, Γ) under med is the sum of the N(ϕ,P) numbers of each ϕ ∈ J.
Another way to look at this value is as a measure of similarity between
J and the aggregated profile P. The distance-based aggregators are
defined using measures of dissimilarity between a J ∈ J(A, Γ) and an
aggregated P ∈ J(A, Γ)n. The concept of dissimilarity between a ratio-
nal judgment set and a profile of rational judgments uses two building
concept: a measure of dissimilarity between two rational judgment
sets and a method for aggregating each dissimilarity value between
one candidate judgment set J ∈ J(A, Γ) and each of the Ji ∈ P.
Distance functions are used to measure the dissimilarity between
two rational judgment sets. Given a set S, a distance function d :
S × S → R, also called a metric [58], is a function that satisfies the
following properties, for each x,y, z ∈ S:
1. d(x,y) > 0 (nonnegativity)
2. d(x,y) = 0 if and only if x = y (identity of the indiscernible)
3. d(x,y) = d(y, x) (symmetry)
4. d(x, z) = d(x,y) + d(y, z) (triangle inequality)
Functions that satisfy properties (1)−(3) but not (4) are called pseudo-
distances, while those that satisfy properties (1), (2), (4) but not (3)
are called quasi-distances. For comparing rational judgments, pseudo-
distances suffice, as no-one has so far, to the best of our knowledge,
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argued for the need of the triangle inequality in the context of judg-
ment aggregation.
There are many (pseudo)-distances defined in the literature in gen-
eral, but only a handful of these are used in judgment aggregation.
The question of what makes a distance function a good measure of
dissimilarity between rational judgment sets remains far from closed.
An in-depth discussion of this question, as well as a list of distance
functions used in judgment aggregation can be found in [59].
After we compare a J ∈ J(A, Γ) with each of the judgment sets Ji in
the profile, what we get is a list of n values (d(J, J1),d(J, J2), . . . ,d(J, Jn)).
We now need a method to aggregate this list of values into a single
value to assign the J. One class of functions that is typically used for
such aggregations are the functions called norms. A norm on Rn is a
mapping η : Rn → R that has the following properties, for all a ∈ R+
and every x,y ∈ Rn :
i . η(ax) = |a|η(x) (absolute homogeneity),
ii . η(x+ y) 6 η(x) + η(y) (subadditivity),
iii . η(x) = 0 if and only if x = (0, . . . , 0).
The best known norm functions, as well as the most used ones in
judgment aggregation, are the Σ and the max. The (i) and (iii) prop-
erties of norms are necessary to guarantee some very essential good
properties of the resulting aggregator. Past this insight, the more gen-
eral question of which are the best value aggregation functions to be
used in the context of judgment aggregation is altogether unexplored.
We can now formally define the class of distance-based judgment
aggregators as follows.
Fd,η(P) = argmin
J∈J(A,Γ)
η(d(J1, J), . . . ,d(J, Jn)) (10)
Let us define the three most frequently discussed and occurring dis-
tances that are featured in the distance-based aggregators. All dis-
tances are defined for any two J, J ′ ∈ J(A, Γ), for any judgment aggre-
gation problem 〈A, Γ ,P〉.
drastic distance. The drastic distance dD is a very crude tool for
measuring dissimilarity. It is defined as follows
dD(J, J ′) =
{
1 if and only ifJ 6= J ′,
0 if and only ifJ = J ′.
(11)
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Intuitively, two judgment sets are either different or this same, this
is the only thing that the drastic distance can determine. The next
distance is more fine-grained.
hamming distance. The Hamming distance dH identifies the num-
ber of issues on which two rational judgment sets give different judg-
ments. For example the judgment set {p∧ r,¬(p∧ s),¬q,¬(p∧ q), t}
and the judgment set {¬(p∧ r),p∧ s,¬q,¬(p∧q),¬t} differ on three is-
sues: {p∧ r,¬(p∧ r)}, {p∧ s,¬(p∧ s)}, and {t,¬t}. Thus, the Hamming
distance between these two judgment sets is 3. The formal definition
of dH, for two complete rational judgment sets, is as follows.
dH(J, J ′) = J \ J ′ = J ′ \ J. (12)
It is, of course, highly arguable whether the Hamming distance is
really the best choice for measuring dissimilarity. A difference in judg-
ments on any issue from the agenda is taken to have an equal "weight"
in determining the overall dissimilarity between two judgment sets.
But not all issues are the same, some are logically related to many
other issues in the agenda, while others are not related to any other
agenda issues. As argued in [59], the Hamming distance does not take
into consideration these possible relevant issues, which was why other
distances and pesudo-distances were defined in [59] and somewhat
earlier in [25]. The distance axiomatised in [25] is the one we present
next.
geodesic distance Whereas the drastic and the Hamming dis-
tances are very easy to define and understand, the geodesic distance
dG is a bot more convoluted. The geodesic distance avoids some of
the shortcomings of the Hamming distance, and, as shown in [25], it is
the only distance function that in addition to the standard properties
(1) − (4) also satisfies properties (5) and (6) defined bellow. Before we
introduce these two new properties, we have to introduce the concept
of betweenness for rational judgment sets.
Consider three distinct J, J ′, J ′′ ∈ J(A, Γ),i.e., J 6= J ′, JJ ′′ and J ′ 6= J ′′.
Intuitively, the judgment set J ′ is said to be between judgment sets J
and J ′′ when J ′ contains all judgments on which J and J ′′ coincide.
Formally, J ′ is said to be between judgment sets J and J ′′ if and only
of (J ∩ J ′′) ⊂ J ′. The judgment set between two judgment sets is in a
way a compromise between them. We can now define properties (5)
and (6) of a distance function d for any three distinct J, J ′, J ′′ ∈ J(A, Γ),
for any A and Γ .
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5. If J ′ is between J and J ′′, then d(J, J ′′) = d(J, J ′) + d(J ′, J ′′).
6. If J and J ′′ are such that there exists no J ′ ∈ J(A, Γ) that is be-
tween them, then d(J, J ′′) = 1.
To intuitively explain property (6) consider the following three ra-
tional judgment sets for A and Γ of Example 7:
J = {p∧ r,p∧ s,q,p∧ q, t}
J ′ = {p∧ r,¬(p∧ s),q,p∧ q, t}
J ′′ = {p∧ r,p∧ s,¬q,¬(p∧ q), t}
The judgment sets J and J ′ differ on only one issue and therefore
by definition there cannot exist a judgment set between them. Thus
for a distance d that satisfies property (6), it must be the case that
d(J, J ′) = 1. We also have dH(J, J ′) = 1, but the Hamming distance
does not satisfy property (6). Consider judgment sets J and J ′′ instead.
These two differ on two issues and therefore dH(J, J ′′) = 2. However, if
we list out all the judgment set in J(A, Γ), we will not find a judgment
set among them that is between J and J ′′. For a distance d that satisfies
property (6), it thus must be the case that d(J, J ′′) = 1 and for the
geodesic distance this is the case.
The geodesic distance is defined as the path distance on an agenda
graph GA,Γ = 〈V ,E〉 where the set of vertices V is precisely the set
J(A, Γ). The set of edges E ⊆ J(A, Γ)× J(A, Γ) is defined as follows.
There exists an edge between vertices J and J ′′ if and only if there exists
no judgment set J ∈ J(A, Γ) that is between J and J ′′. The geodesic
distance between two rational J and J ′, is the minimal path between
them in G.
An example is on order, but fist a note. Note that the only difference
between a GA,Γ and GΦ,IC for corresponding agenda and (integrity)
constraints, is that the nodes in the first graph have sets of formulas
and in the second lists of 0s and 1s of length the same as the cardinality
of the sets. Thus the graphs GΦ,IC for judgment aggregation problems
in the binary framework are visually much neater than the equiva-
lent GA,Γ for the same judgment aggregation problem represented in
the logic framework. Therefore exceptionally we give the example of
agenda graph for the binary framework.
Example 14. Consider the agenda and integrity constraints from Ex-
ample 8. Figure 3 depicts the agenda graph for these agenda and
integrity constraints. Recall that this judgment aggregation problem
was a rewriting in the binary framework of the agenda and constraints
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in the logic framework given in Example 7. Observe that every vertex
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 corresponds to exactly one judgment set J and:
x1 = 1 if and only if p∧ r ∈ J, x1 = 0 if and only if ¬(p∧ r) ∈ J
x2 = 1 if and only if p∧ s ∈ J, x2 = 0 if and only if ¬(p∧ s) ∈ J
x3 = 1 if and only if q ∈ J, x3 = 0 if and only if ¬q ∈ J
x4 = 1 if and only if p∧ q ∈ J, x4 = 0 if and only if ¬(p∧ q) ∈ J
x5 = 1 if and only if t ∈ J, x5 = 0 if and only if ¬t ∈ J.
11111
01111
10111
11110
00111
01110
10110
11001
00101
00110
01001
10001
11000
00001
00100
01000
10000
00000
Figure 3: Agenda graph for the judgment aggregation problem of Exam-
ples 8 and 7.
In the graph on Figure 3, all the edges in black are between judgments
(sets) that are at a Hamming distance one from each other, while the
edge in red is between judgments (sets) that are not at a Hamming
distance one form each other.
We can say that in a way, the geodesic distance refines the Hamming
distance. The following properties between the two distances are very
easy to observe for any J, J ′ ∈ J(A, Γ): if dH(J, J ′) = 1, then dG(J, J ′) =
1 and, more generally, dH(J, J ′) > dG(J, J ′).
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specific distance-based aggregators We now give the specific
distance-based aggregators that have made an appearance in the liter-
ature. The sub-class of aggregators Fd,Σ was defined in [52] under the
name Prototype. We already mentioned that the med aggregator is
distance-based. More precisely med is the aggregator FdH,Σ. The proof
that FdH,Σ and med is straightforward and we leave it as an exercise to
the reader5.
The other two specific distance-base aggregators are FdG,Σ, intro-
duced in [25] and analysed in [14], as well as FdH,max, also analysed in
[14]. The aggregator FdD,Σ selects the judgment sets in the profile that
are shared by the highest number of agents6, when such a judgment
set exists and the entire profile otherwise. This aggregator is consid-
ered for historical reasons, it is related to a well known voting rule, but
it is otherwise uninteresting.
3.4.2 Scoring aggregators
The next class of aggregators we consider are the scoring aggregators.
This class was introduced in [26]. This class is defined around the idea
that each agent can set a value for every judgment in her judgment set.
Intuitively, this value can be seen as an answer to the question: "if I
reverse my judgment on this issue, how much would it cost me?". The
class of scoring aggregators is defined around a scoring function.
A scoring function s : A× J(A, Γ) → R assigns a value to a pair of
judgment and a rational judgment set. Intuitively, the scoring func-
tion tells us how much is each judgment in a particular judgment set
"worth".
Several scoring functions are introduced in [26]. We include here
two that are more interesting: the simple scoring function and the reversal
scoring function (defined for any A and Γ ).
The simple scoring function sI is defined as follows.
sI(ϕ, J) =
{
1 if and only ifϕ ∈ J,
0 if and only if¬ϕ ∈ J, (13)
The reversal scoring function srev is much more convoluted than
the simple one. Intuitively, the reversal scoring function counts what
is the smallest number of judgments that have to be "flipped" in J
5 Hint: observe that the Hamming distance can also be defined as
dH(J, J ′) =
∑
ϕ∈J,ϕ′∈J′
dD({ϕ}, {ϕ ′})
6 Also called a plurality-supported judgment set.
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for consistency to not be violated when ϕ in J is replaced with ¬ϕ.
Formally this is the definition:
srev(ϕ, J) = argmin
J∗∈J(A,Γ)
¬ϕ∈J∗
dH(J, J∗). (14)
Example 15. Consider the judgment aggregation problem of the "doc-
trinal paradox", Example 4. Tables 12 and 12 give the scores for each
judgment in every rational judgment set both for the simple and the
reversal scoring function. Recall that we had A+ = {p,q,d} and Γ =
{(p∧ q)↔ d}.
sI(ϕ, Ji) p ¬p q ¬q d ¬d
{p,q,d} 1 0 1 0 1 0
{p,¬q,¬d} 1 0 0 1 0 1
{¬p,q,¬d} 0 1 1 0 0 1
{¬p,¬q,¬d} 0 1 0 1 0 1Table 12: Simple scores for judgments in the "doctrinal paradox", Example 4.
srev(ϕ, Ji) p ¬p q ¬q d ¬d
{p,q,d} 2 0 2 0 2 0
{p,¬q,¬d} 1 0 0 2 0 2
{¬p,q,¬d} 0 2 1 0 0 2
{¬p,¬q,¬d} 0 1 0 1 0 2Table 13: Reversal scores for judgments in the "doctrinal paradox", Example 4.
A scoring aggregator assigns the most similar judgment sets with
respect to sims to the aggregated profile.
Formally
Fs = argmax
J∈J(A,Γ)
∑
Ji∈P
∑
ϕ∈Ji∩J
s(ϕ, Ji) (15)
Having defined a scoring function s, we can compare how similar
a judgment set J ∈ J(A, Γ) is with a particular judgment set Ji in a
profile P by simply summing up the values of all the judgments that
Ji shares with J. Formally, we define the similarity measure sims :
J(A, Γ)× J(A, Γ)→ R as
sims(Ji, J) =
∑
ϕ∈Ji∩J
s(ϕ, Ji). (16)
Observe that if we count the values assigned to judgments that J
does not share with Ji, we define a dissimilarity measure. However, it
is not necessary that this dissimilarity measure is a distance function.
Dietrich in [26] does not set any requirements on the scoring functions,
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not even that they should be positive. However, it is not difficult to
observe that a similarity measure will have the following properties,
for every J, Ji ∈ J(A, Γ), for any A, Γ :
• sims(Ji, J) > 0,
• sims(Ji, J) = 0 if and only if Ji = J.
While sims satisfies nonnegativity and identity of the indiscernible, it
may not satisfy even symmetry, let alone triangle inequality. We have
that
simI(J, J ′) = simI(J ′, J), but for simrev this is not the case. Consider Ex-
ample 15. We have that simrev({p,q,d}, {p,¬q,¬d}) = 2, while
simrev({p,¬q,¬d}, {p,q,d}) = 1.
For simI even triangular inequality holds. Observe that simI(J, J ′) =
m − dH(J, J ′), where m is the cardinality of the pre-agenda. Conse-
quently, the aggregators FI, med and FdH,Σ are the same aggregator:
FI = med = FdH,Σ.
3.4.3 fullH and the rationalising aggregators class
The last class of aggregators we consider, we call here rationalising ag-
gregators. The rationalising aggregators combine the two ideas for con-
structing aggregators: changing the profile in a minimal way to make
it majority-consistent and using (dis)similarity measures to compare
judgment sets. Intuitively, the rationalising aggregators "assume" that
the aggregated profile has "errors" and look for the most similar "ideal"
profile to aggregate instead by using issue-by-issue majority.
Given an agenda A and associated constraints Γ , let M(A, Γ ,n) ⊆
J(A, Γ)n be the set of all majority-consistent profiles for A and Γ . More
precisely M(A, Γ ,n) = {P | P ∈ J(A, Γ)n and m(P) ∈ J(A, Γ)}. To ease
notation, we will write M when A, Γ and n are clear from the con-
test. For Miller and Osherson [52] this set M contained the "ideal"
profiles. To compare two profiles for (dis)similarity they used a dis-
tance function D defined over sets of profiles with the same number of
agents. Namely, D is a distance function of type D : S× S→ R where
S ⊆ J(A, Γ)n.
The way Miller and Osherson construct their D functions in [52]
is by considering a distance function d between judgment sets. For
P,P ′ ∈ J(A, Γ)n, P = (J1, . . . , Jn), P ′ = (J ′1, . . . , J ′n):
D(P,P ′) =
n∑
i=1
d(Ji, J ′i) (17)
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However, any combination of a norm η and a distance function d
between judgment sets yields a distance function between profiles of
judgment sets. So in general we can define
Dη,d(P,P ′) = η(d(J1, J ′1), . . . ,d(Jn, J
′
n)). (18)
Let C ⊆ J(A, Γ)n be the set of all "ideal" profiles to which a profile
P ∈ J(A, Γ)n is compared. Let c : C→ J(A, Γ) be a resolute aggregator
that assigns a profile from C to a rational judgment set. We can now
give a formal definition of the class of rationalising aggregators.
F
d,η
C,c(P) = {c(P
′) | argmin
P ′∈C
Dη,d(P,P ′)}. (19)
We already saw that one such "ideal" collection of profiles is
M(A, Γ ,n). The class of rationalising aggregators defined in [52], fulld
is a special case of our class Fd,ηM,m, where m is the issue-by-issue ma-
jority. Of this class, the best known is the specific rule fullH = F
dH,Σ
M,m .
Another set of intuitively "ideal" profiles is the set of profiles in
which all the agents have the same judgment set, we can call this the
unanimity profile collection7. We can define this collection U(A, Γ ,n) ⊂
M(A, Γ ,n) ⊂ J(A, Γ)n as
U(A, Γ ,n) = {P | P ∈ J(A, Γ)n and u(P) ∈ J(A, Γ)}. (20)
Interestingly, we obtain that Fd,ηU,u = F
d,η, namely that the distance-
based aggregators are a sub-class of the rationalising aggregators. This
relation between aggregators is not difficult to prove and we leave it
as an exercise for the reader.
Lastly, we need to mention that t here is considerable work on ratio-
nalising aggregators within the scope of preference aggregation. We
would like to point the interested reader to [60].
3.5 Other aggregators
Apart from the aggregators we have so far introduced and classified,
we need to mention some of the other aggregators that have appeared
in the literature, but that do fit in the classifications we have introduced.
We give here the intuition behind these aggregator. For the formal
definitions, the reader should consult the respective cited publications.
The first one in this collection is the extended conclusion-based proce-
dure introduced in [44]. Recall that the conclusion-based procedure ap-
7 For each uniform quota aggregator we can define an "ideal" collection of profiles.
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plied only to agendas that can be partitioned into agenda of premises
and agenda of conclusions. The conclusion-based procedure aggre-
gates only the judgments on the conclusions, using the issue-by-issue
majority, thus always producing incomplete judgment sets. In [44] the
conclusion-based procedure is extended with a distance-based aggre-
gator. First the judgments on the conclusion issues are aggregated and
the disjunction of the obtained collective judgment sets is added to Γ .
Next the whole profile is aggregated using the new constraints. This
procedure is best to explain using the simple example of the "doctrinal
paradox" judgment aggregation problem.
Example 16. Recall the "doctrinal paradox" judgment aggregation prob-
lem: A+p = {p,q, }, A+c = {d}, Γ = {(p∧q)↔ d} and P = ({p,q,d}, {¬p,q,¬d},
{p,¬q,¬d}). Let us use the FdH,Σ aggregator on the profile of premises.
We obtain FdH,Σ(P↓Ac) = {¬d}. We now extend the set of constraints
Γ ′ = Γ ∪ {∨ FdH,Σ(P↓Ac)}, which here simply yields Γ ′ = {p∧ q) ↔
d,d}.
We now aggregate P with Γ ′ using again FdH,Σ. There are three
rational judgment sets in J(A, Γ ′), of which {¬p,q,¬d} and {p,¬q,¬d}
are closest to P so these are the collective judgment sets selected by the
extended conclusion based procedure.
Note that in the extended conclusion based procedure, in the second
step there might be judgment sets in the profile that are not rational
for the new constraints, as indeed is the case with {p,q,d} in the above
example. The distance used to define the aggregator should be able to
handle comparing rational and irrational judgment sets. This is not a
problem for the drastic and the Hamming distances, but the geodesic
distance cannot be used.
The second aggregator we consider is the aggregator that chooses
the most representative voter proposed in [33]. This aggregator is distance-
based aggregator that instead of choosing a collective judgment set
from the entire set J(A, Γ), it limits its choice from among the sets in
the aggregated profile P. We illustrate this approach with an example.
Example 17. Consider the judgment aggregation problem of Example 7,
with the profile from Table 2. Let us use the med aggregator. There are
three distinct rational judgment sets in the profile and the values for
each are given in Table 14. The most representative voter procedure,
when the med aggregator is used selects the set {p∧ r,p∧ s,q,p∧q, t}
as a collective judgment set.
The last aggregator we consider here is a class of aggregators intro-
duced in [61] and called binomial rules. This class of aggregators are
defined for the binary framework, but of course can be applied for
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J Value
{p∧ r,p∧ s,q,p∧ q, t} 49
{p∧ r,p∧ s,¬q,¬(p∧ q), t} 45
{¬(p∧ r),¬(p∧ s),q,¬(p∧ q),¬t} 46Table 14: The value of each judgment in the the profile of Table 2 for the same
profile.
judgment aggregation problems in the logic framework as well. The
binomial rules assign scores, or values to patterns of accepted/rejected
issues so instead of comparing whole judgment sets for similarity, they
compare how similar are certain subsets (corresponding to particular
subset of agenda issues) in the judgment sets, allowing for certain sub-
sets to be more relevant than others. The most representative voter
and the medial rule are shown to be special cases of the binomial rules
class.
3.6 A note on tie-breaking and good domains
As we pointed out at the begining of this section, all of the specific
judgment aggregation aggregators proposed in the literature are either
irresolute, or partial, i.e., do not satisfy the universal domain property.
When a single rational judgment set is needed, there needs to be a way
to break the tie between the collective judgment sets. Tie-breaking is
not an uncommon practice in social choice, however it is significantly
under-explored in judgment aggregation.
The simplest approach to tie-breaking is to assign a default ordering
over the set J(A, Γ). Although effective this method is not very prac-
tical given that the set can have exponentially many members, with
respect to the size of the agenda. Another simple approach is to as-
sign a default ordering over the judgments in the agenda A. However,
although more practical, this method is not as effective since it may
not be able to completely break the ties. In the next section we will
discuss properties of aggregators. How ties are broken can have an
effect on the resulting properties of the combination aggregator, tie-
breaking method, as observed in [30]. What is a good way to break
ties in judgment aggregation remains an open research problem.
Particularly in light of tie-breaking issues, it is of interest to identify
subsets of J(A, Γ)n for which the partial but resolute aggregators are
well defined. Compared with preference aggregation, the so called re-
stricted domains are unexplored in the context of judgment aggregation.
The exception to this is the work of Dietrich and List [62] and the ear-
lier [63]. Dietrich and List identify four restricted domains for which
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the issue-by-issue majority gives a complete and consistent judgment
set: single-plateaued profiles, single-canyoned profiles, unidimension-
ally aligned profiles and unidimensionally ordered profiles.
The single-plateaued profiles and single-canyoned profiles are iden-
tified by the existence of at least one total order >, called structuring
order, over the agenda A. Informally, single-plateauedness requires
that every individual’s judgment set contains an "interval" (a plateau)
of judgments with respect to >. For example, if ϕi > ϕj > ϕk is
part of the structuring order, and J is such that {ϕi,ϕk} ⊆ J, then it
has to be the case that ϕj ∈ J otherwise the judgment set will not
have a plateau and a profile that includes such a judgment set will not
be single-plateaued. Single-canyonedness on the other hand, requires
that the rejected judgments by each agent form such an interval (a
canyon). So if if ϕi > ϕj > ϕk and {ϕi,ϕk} 6⊆ J, then the judgment
ϕj must also be rejected, i.e., ¬ϕj ∈ J. Every single-canyoned profile
is also a single-plateaued profile.
It is not so simple to identify the agendas and constraints for which
all of the profiles in J(A, Γ) are single-plateaued although there clearly
is a relation between the logical relations among the agenda issues and
the existence of the structuring order.
The unidimensionally ordered profiles are identified by the exis-
tence of at least one total order %, also called a structuring order, over
the set of agents in P. A profile is unidimensionally ordered if for all
agents Ji ∈ P it holds that Ji−1 % Ji % Ji+1 and for each judgment,
the individuals accepting it are all adjacent to each other. Identifying
if a profile is the unidimensionally aligned is very simple: there exists
a total order over the judgment sets in P such that J1 % J2 % · · · % Jn
and for all n > i > 1, Ji is between judgment sets Ji−1 and Ji+1. All
unidimensionally aligned profiles are also unidimensionally ordered
profiles.
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4 properties of aggregators
Having introduced the various specific and classes of judgment aggre-
gators, we present and discuss the properties of judgment aggregators
that can be encountered in the literature under various contexts. Al-
ready in Chapter 3 we encountered two such properties: universal do-
main and majority-preservation. The study of aggregator properties
serves both an academic and a practical purpose. Desirable and un-
desirable combinations of aggregator properties help us characterise
the existence of aggregators. Researchers in philosophy, political sci-
ence and related fields, may identify good and bad properties of ag-
gregators, typically expressed as relations that should or should not
hold between the aggregated profile and the resulting collective judg-
ment sets. Once mathematically formalised, researchers can identify
whether, and how many, functions that satisfy these properties exist.
If it is determined that no functions exists, i.e., an impossibility result
is reached, the researchers can refocus their efforts. Practically, know-
ing which aggregators satisfy which properties helps us match specific
aggregators to specific (types of) judgment aggregation problems.
The study of aggregator properties in judgment aggregation is some-
what paradoxical. Since the first decade of research in judgment ag-
gregation had been marked by a pursuit for characterisation results,
most properties are defined for resolute aggregators only. On the
other hand, most aggregators are not resolute. This has now begun
to change and we have some properties studied for irresolute aggrega-
tors. We present both types of properties here. In the last section we
given an overview of which properties are known to hold for which
aggregators, and point out to the gaps in the literature.
We should mention that, at present there exists no characterisation
results on any of the irresolute aggregators. An exception is the med
aggregator for whose characterisation Nehring and Pivato have ob-
tained some results [36].
4.1 Resoluteness-independent properties
Some properties are very intuitive and simple and can be defined re-
gardless of whether the aggregator is resolute or irresolute. We begin
introducing aggregator properties by introducing this class of proper-
ties whose desirability is very easy to defend.
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dictatorship. The first desirable aggregator property is that of non-
dictatorship. This is a very simple and intuitive requirement that the
aggregator does not always select as collective the judgment set repre-
senting one particular agent regardless of what are the judgment sets
of the other agents in the profile.
Consider profiles P = (J∗, J1, . . . , Jn−1) and P ′ = (J∗, J ′1, . . . , J
′
n−1).
The agent J∗ is a dictator, and F a dictatorial aggregator if F(P) =
F(P) = J∗ regardless of what the other judgment sets Ji ∈ P and J ′i ∈ P
responsivness Related but not the same to non-dictatorship is the
desirable property of responsiveness [64, 13]. Non-imposition is the
requirement that any one rational judgment set has a "chance" of being
selected as a collective judgment set. More precisely there exists at
least one profile P ∈ J(A, Γ)n for every J ∈ J(A, Γ) such that F(P) = {J}.
unanimity. Another simple, intuitive, and related desirable prop-
erty, is that of unanimity. Assume that every single agent in the profile
has chosen the exact same judgment set. It is hard to argue that this
judgment set, and no other, must be selected as the collective. This is
the property of unanimity. If P ∈ J(A, Γ)n is such that P = (J1, . . . , Jn)
and for every 1 6 i 6 n, Ji = J for some J ∈ J(A, Γ), then necessarily
F(P) = {J}. It is very easy to observe that F satisfies unanimity then
it will necessarily satisfy non-imposition. We need to also note that,
for the class of distance-based aggregators, the satisfying of unanim-
ity is due to the function d satisfying the identity of the indiscernible
property and the function η satisfying the property (iii).
anonymity. The last property in this class that we will consider is
anonymity. An aggregator is anonymous if the choice of collective judg-
ment sets does not depend on the order in which the agents are listed
in the profile. Let P and P ′ be two profiles that differ only on the or-
der in which the agents in them are listed. For an anonymous F, it
must hold that F(P) = F(P ′). The desirability of anonymity is not quite
so without reproach as unanimity. Assume that the agents are experts,
with some experts being better at making judgments than others. If we
want that the better experts have more influence on what the collective
judgments are, then F should not be anonymous. Non-anonymous
aggregators are rarely discussed and designed [65].
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4.2 Properties of resolute aggregators
A resolute aggregator is a function that matches a profile of judgment
sets to a single rational collective judgment set. Early on it was shown,
in works such as [12], that some basic sets of properties cannot be si-
multaneously satisfied by one aggregator. Some of these conditions
we take as so indispensable that we have here imbedded them in the
definition of an aggregator: that the collective judgment set(s) must
be both complete and a consistent agenda subset. Others we will now
present and discuss. It is not our goal in this Section to give a detailed
overview of impossibility results, the interested reader can consult [13]
as a very comprehensive source of information on this topic. Our goal
is rather to introduce the reader to the existence of these properties for
purposes of completeness and better understanding of the more gen-
eral and, from the view-point of multi agent systems, more practical
properties of irresolute aggregators.
4.2.1 Unanimity Preservation, Systematicity
The first set of resolute property we present are featured in the first
works in judgment aggregation showing, together with rationality, anonymity
and non-dictatorship, the impossibility of existence for an aggregator
to satisfy all properties. We begin with unanimity preservation, which
is often simply called unanimity. Intuitively what the unanimity tries
protect are the issue-unanimities, namely, when agents all agree on
the judgment of one issue, than that judgment must be in the collective
judgment set, regardless of what the judgments on the other issues are.
At first glance, this property is desirable, however, arguments can be
found that question this desirability. We give an illustrative example.
Example 18. Consider the judgment aggregation problem with an agenda
with pre-agenda A+ = {p,q, r, s, t}, constraints Γ = {t ↔ (p∨ q∨ r∨
s)}, and the profile P given in Table 15. The profile P has unanim-
ity both on judgment ¬p and on judgment t. For a (resolute) func-
tion that satisfies the unanimity preservation, it must be the case that
{¬p, t} ⊆ F(P). However, the first issue is not the same as the last issue,
in terms of how logically"entrenched" the judgments on each issue are
with respect to the judgments on the rest of the issues in the agenda.
Were the first four issues in the agenda premises, and the last is-
sue a conclusion, the premise based procedure would yield PBP(P) =
{¬p,¬q,¬r,¬s,¬t}, observing the unanimity preservation for ¬p, but
violating it for t. Since the unanimity preservation requires that una-
nimity is preserved on every issue, PBP fails to satisfy this property.
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Voters p q r s t
Γ = {t↔ (p∨ q∨ r∨ s)}
J1 - + - - +
J2 - - + - +
J3 - - - + +Table 15: Profiles illustrating the unanimity preservation
unanimity preservation A resolute aggregator F satisfies the una-
nimity preservation if and only if, for every ϕ ∈ A and every P ∈
J(A, Γ)n, it holds: if ϕ ∈ Ji for every Ji ∈ P, then ϕ ∈ F(P). The
judgment ϕ is called a unanimously supported judgment.
The next property we consider is actually comprised of two proper-
ties: neutrality and independence of irrelevant alternatives.
The independence of irrelevant alternatives is satisfied when the col-
lective judgment on each issue is obtained by aggregating (only) the
individual judgments on that issue and no other judgments have a
weigh in on that judgment. Formally we can express this requirement
as follows.
independence of irrelevant alternatives (iia). A resolute ag-
gregator F satisfies IIA if and only if, for any two profiles P1,P2 ∈
J(A, Γ), and any issue {ϕ,¬ϕ} ∈ A such that P↓{ϕ,¬ϕ}1 = P
↓{ϕ,¬ϕ}
2 it
holds: ϕ ∈ F(P1) if and only if ϕ ∈ F(P2).
The IIA property is very strong, and certainly of questionable de-
sirability, since it requires that aggregation of judgments on an issue,
logically related to judgments on other agenda issues, should not de-
pend on those other judgments. This is expressed in the requirement
that when two profiles have exactly the same agents giving exactly the
same judgments on one issue, i.e., P↓{ϕ,¬ϕ}1 = P
↓{ϕ,¬ϕ}
2 , should select
exactly the same collective judgments for this issue, regardless of how
much or little the profiles differ on the rest of the judgments.
Because IIA is intuitively such a strong requirement, a weakening
was proposed in [27] called Independence of Irrelevant Propositional Al-
ternatives (IIPA). Instead of requiring that the aggregator satisfies the
independence on aggregation on every agenda issue, the IIPA requires
that independence only on those issues that are propositional variables.
The IIPA property is only defined for agendas closed under proposi-
tional variables in the logic framework with Γ = {>}. We will omit the
formal definition of this property.
The second part of systematicity is the property of neutrality. While
anonymity is concerned with the insensitivity of the aggregator to the
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order of of agents in the profile, neutrality is concerned with the insen-
sitivity of the aggregator to the order, or rather "name", "type", "nature"
of the issues in the agenda. Neutrality was considered as simple and
weak requirement in the early work in judgment aggregation, so it was
not formalised. We find two formalisations, or versions, of neutrality
in [31] called Issue-Neutrality and Domain-Neutrality defined for aggre-
gators in the binary framework. Intuitively the neutrality properties
are concerned with profiles in which two issues have the same "pat-
tern" of judgments. The issue-neutrality is concerned with the "posi-
tive pattern", when all agents in the profile either accept or reject both
issues. The domain-neutrality is concerned with the "negative pattern",
when all agents in the profile reject the second issue when they accept
the first and vice-versa. In the case of the "positive pattern" a issue-
neutral aggregator would require that the same "pattern"is observed in
the collective judgment set, while a domain-neutral aggregator would
require the same in the case of the "negative pattern". We give an
example in the logic framework.
Example 19. Consider the agenda with pre-agenda A+ = {p∧ r,p∧
s,q,p∧ q, t} with Γ = {>}, so again the same one of Example 7. Con-
sider the profiles P1 (on the top side) and P2 (on the bottom side),
given in Table 16.
Agents p∧ r p∧ s q p∧ q t
Γ = {>}
J1 - + + + -
J2 + - - - +
J3 + - + + +
Agents p∧ r p∧ s q p∧ q t
Γ = {>}
J1 - + + + +
J2 + - - - -
J3 + - + + -Table 16: Profiles P1 and P2 used to illustrating the issue- and domain-
neutrality principles.
In the profile P1 (on the top side) we observe a "positive pattern":
for every agent Ji ∈ P1 we have that p∧ r ∈ Ji if and only if t ∈ Ji.
In the profile P2 (on the lbottom side) we observe a "negative pattern":
for every agent Ji ∈ P1 we have that p∧ r ∈ Ji if and only if ¬t ∈ Ji.
We give the formal definitions of the issue- and domain-neutrality
properties in the logic framework. Let us state the following three
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conditions for for any two issues {ϕ,¬ϕ} ⊂ A and {ψ,¬ψ} ⊂ A and
every profile P ∈ J(A, Γ)n:
A. ϕ ∈ Ji if and only if ψ ∈ Ji.
B. ϕ ∈ F(P) if and only if ψ ∈ F(P).
C. ϕ ∈ Ji if and only if ¬ψ ∈ Ji.
D. ϕ ∈ F(P) if and only if ¬ψ ∈ F(P).
issue-neutrality An aggregator F satisfies issue-neutrality if and
only if conditions A and B hold.
domain-neutrality An aggregator F satisfies domain-neutrality if
and only if conditions C and D hold.
Already from Example 19 we can observe that when the neutrality is
not quite as "weak" property as it may appear. Namely in Example 19
we can observe the "patterns" in the profile can occur between two
issues that are not logically related. These "patterns" can also occur be-
tween issues that are very strongly logically related, such as judgments
ϕ and ψ for example for which the constraint ϕ ↔ ψ holds. The in-
tuition behind neutrality that the "name" of the issue does not matter
only what judgments were cast for it, is weakened in the presence of
logical relations.
The version of neutrality considered to build systematicity is the
issue-neutrality [13]. This version can also be considered a "weaker"
requirement because it does not "insist" that particular collective judg-
ments are selective as collective, just that they have to be the same.
Systematicity has very early been cast-off the sphere of interest as a
very strong requirement for aggregators.
systematicity An aggregator satisfies systematicity if and only if it
satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives and issue-neutrality.
Intuitively, while independence of irrelevant alternatives stipulates
that the judgments on each issue have to be aggregated separately
from the others (illustration Figure 4 left-hand side table), systemat-
ically requires that this issue-based aggregation is done in the same
way (illustration Figure 4 right-hand side table).
It was shown that the systematicity, unanimity preservation, ratio-
nality, and non-dictatorship yield an impossibility result, see in [12] .
Impossibility results regarding the combination of unanimity preser-
vation, rationality, independence of irrelevant alternatives and non-
dictatorship can be found in [12, 34].
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Figure 4: Illustrating the difference between the properties of indipendence of
irrelevant alternatives (left-hand side) and systematicity (right-hand
side).
4.2.2 Monotonicity
The next set of properties we consider are monotonicity properties. There
are more than one version of this property defined in the literature.
Intuitively the monotonicity property states that if a judgment is as-
signed as a collective judgment for one profile it should also be a as-
signed as collective for any profile in which there is even more support
for that judgment. Sometimes the intuition is given as the paradigm:
an increase in support for an issue should not damage that issues
chances of being collectively supported. Depending on whether the
increase in support is for one judgment or a whole judgment set, dif-
ferent notions of monotonicity can be defined.
Monotonicity over whole judgment sets is defined in [66]. We state
the definition here and call it set monotonicity to differentiate it from
the other monotonicity properties.
set monotonicity. A resolute aggregator F is set monotonic if and
only if for every two profiles P,P ′ ∈ J(A, Γ)n, with
P = (J1, . . . , Ji, . . . , Jn) and P ′ = (J1, . . . , J, . . . , Jn), if F(P) = J, then
F(P ′) = J.
Set monotonicity guarantees that if an agent Ji replaces her judg-
ment set with the collective judgment set J, and no other change is
made in the profile, then J continues to be the collective judgment
set. In contrast to strengthening the support for a whole judgment set,
we can consider the case when support is strengthen for a particular
judgment. This gives us an another type of monotonicity, defined in
[64], which we here call issue monotonicity. If one agent in the profile
changes only one of her judgments from ¬ϕ to ϕ, then if ϕ was in
the collective judgment set for the old profile, it should remain in the
collective judgment set in the new profile.
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We first define the concept of ϕ-strengthening of a profile. A profile
P ∈ J(A, Γ)n is an ϕ-strengthening of profile P ′ ∈ J(A, Γ)n, ϕ ∈ A, if
P = (J1, . . . , Ji, . . . , Jn) and P ′ = (J1, . . . , J ′i, . . . , Jn) with Ji \ J
′
i = ϕ.
Intuitively, a profile is ϕ-strengthening of another profile if it differs
from it on exactly one judgment in exactly one judgment set. Exam-
ple 20 gives two such profiles.
Example 20. Consider the judgment aggregation problem of the "doc-
trinal paradox", Example 4. The profile P (left-hand side on Table 17)
is the "doctrinal paradox" profile. The profile P ′ (reft-hand side on Ta-
ble 17) is an ¬p-strengthening of P because it differs from P only on
one judgment set, that is J3 and J ′3 and q ∈ J3, while ¬q ∈ J ′3.
Agents p q d
Γ = {(p∧ q)↔ d}
J1 + + +
J2 + - -
J3 - + -
Agents p q d
Γ = {(p∧ q)↔ d}
J1 + + +
J2 + - -
J ′3 - - -Table 17: Profile P ′ on the right-hand side is a ¬p-strengthening of a profile P
on the left-hand side.
Clearly, not all profiles will have their ϕ-strengthening for every is-
sueϕ in the agenda, and some might not even have anϕ-strengthening
for any agenda issue ϕ. The monotonicity properties defined around
the idea of ϕ-strengthening of a profile apply their requirements only
on profiles that do have an ϕ-strengthening profile.
issue monotonicity. A resolute aggregator F is issue monotonic if
for every profile P ′ and its ϕ-strengthening profile P, for any ϕ ∈ A, if
ϕ ∈ F(P ′), then ϕ ∈ F(P).
A weakening of issue monotonicity was also proposed in [64]. Intu-
itively, while issue monotonicity requires that the strengthening of sup-
port of one judgment never "pushes out" that judgment from the collec-
tive judgment set, weak monotonicity requires that the same judgment
should sometimes not be "pushed out". We give the formal definition.
The difference in the text of the definitions is slight.
weak issue monotonicity. A resolute aggregator F is issue mono-
tonic if for every profile P ′ and its ϕ-strengthening profile P, for any
ϕ ∈ A, it is not the case that if ϕ ∈ F(P ′), then ¬ϕ ∈ F(P).
Grandi and Endriss [31] define the issue monotonicity for the binary
framework and also define another version of monotonicity, which we
call neutral monotonicity to distinguish it. We give the definition here for
the logic framework. Intuitively neutral monotonicity stipulates that if
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for some judgments ϕ,ϕ ′ ∈ A, if the support for ϕ ′ in the profile is
larger than the support for ϕ and ϕ is in the collective judgment set,
then so should ϕ ′ be in it.
neutral monotonicity. A resolute aggregator F is neutral mono-
tonic if and only if for every P ∈ J(A, Γ)n and any two ϕ,ψ ∈ A, if
N(ϕ,P) < N(ψ,P) and ϕ ∈ F(P), then ψ ∈ F(P).
Monotonicity properties are desirable because, each in their own
way, ensure that the aggregator is responsive to the individual judg-
ment sets. Another source of desirability of (weak) issue monotonicity,
in particular, is that it is necessary to ensure that an aggregator si non-
manipulable[64]. We discuss briefly the non-manipulability condition.
Grossi and Pigozzi devote a section in [13] to this topic (Chapter 5).
4.2.3 Manipulability
Assume that an agent has an incentive that a certain judgment, or judg-
ment set, is selected among, or as, the collective judgment sets. An
agent manipulates, when she does not include that certain judgment,
but its opposite in her judgment set, or when she does not "declare"
her most "desirable" judgment set. An aggregator is non-manipulable
when no agent can get a more desirable collective judgment (set) by
manipulating. Dietrich and List show in [64] that an aggregator is
non-manipulable when it satisfies independence of irrelevant alterna-
tives and at least weak monotonicity. They also show that for a path-
connected agenda an aggregator does not exist that satisfies univer-
sal domain, collective rationality, responsiveness, non-dictatorship and
non-manipulability.
Non-manipulability is a desirable conditions, as it ensures the "fair-
ness" of the aggregator. Studies of manipulability is where game the-
ory and judgment aggregation intersect. In voting, or preference aggre-
gation problems, the "incentives" are built into the aggregation prob-
lem - the agent is represented with a preference order over the set of
alternatives. With judgment aggregation problems this is not the case.
Dietrich and List suggest that a distance function can be used in lieu of
incentives, every agent’s judgment sets is his most preferred one and
the closer a rational judgment set is to that most desirable judgment
set, the happier the agent is with it [64].
At this point we would like to give some pointers to the literature in
computational social choice that studies various complexity problems
encountered under manipulability under different contexts.
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In [17] the Hamming distance is used to model the incentives for
manipulation and the complexity of manipulability for the premise
based procedure is considered.
In [49] issues of manipulability and bribery are considered, also for
Hamming distance incentives, for the uniform quota rules and the
premise based procedure. Intuitively, bribery is the problem of finding
the minimal number of agents to change their judgment set in some
minimal fashion so that a particular judgment (set) is selected (called
constructive manipulation) or a particular particular judgment (set) is
not selected (called destructive manipulation).
In [50] the question of group manipulation is studied, again under
Hamming distance constructed preferences, for (issue) neutral aggre-
gators. Intuitively, group manipulation is the manipulation version in
which the agents do not manipulate on their own, but together with
other agents.
In contrast to the work we so far mentioned, the context of interest
in [67] is when the "manipulator" is not one of the agents but the "de-
signer" of the agenda, the agenda setter, and bundling attack. Intuitively
bundling attacks are manipulations by changing the agenda, attempts
to get a particular judgment, or judgment set set, be in, or out of, the
collective judgment set, by combining several issues into one. In the
judgment aggregation problem the agenda is given as-is. To study
these types of manipulation problems, we must model also the phase
in which the agenda is set. Alon et al. consider the special case when
the agenda is simple, i.e., no issue is logically dependent on any of
the other issues.
Lastly we mention the [68] article that also studies the manipulabil-
ity problem for the agenda setter from the social choice theoretic as-
pect, showing new impossibility results in this context. Dietrich stud-
ies the question of agenda sensitivity, whether the collective judgment
sets can be controlled by changing the agenda, intuitively explained
as in some logically equivalent way. Examples of logically equivalent
ways to change the agenda are when some of the agenda issues are re-
placed by some logically equivalent formulas, or when the issues are
replaced with a conjunction of issues.
As even this brief overview of studies on manipulability intimates,
these problems are many and widely unexplored in computational
judgment aggregation, but are of interest in contexts of competitive
self-interested agents, but not in contexts in which the agents are for
example experts that merely contribute their opinions but are individ-
ually unaffected by the collective judgment set.
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4.3 Properties of irresolute aggregators
In this section we consider properties of irresolute aggregators. The
purpose of defining these properties is to be able to differentiate be-
tween the aggregators and match them with particular problem con-
texts. Theres exists one result in which irresolute aggregator proper-
ties are used to give a characterisation of an aggregator, and we give
an overview of that result here as well.
4.3.1 Generalising properties
To define the when an irresolute aggregator property generalises a
resolute aggregator property we first observe that for every irresolute
aggregator F there exist a subset of profiles, possibly empty, for which
F is resolute.
Recall that an aggregator F that satisfies universal domain is de-
fined8 as F : J(A, Γ)n → P∗(J(A, Γ)), there exists a set SF ⊆ J(A, Γ)n,
such that for every P ∈ S, F(P) is a singleton sit. We call this set SF the
resolute domain restriction for F.
An irresolute aggregator property IPropF generalises a resolute ag-
gregator property RPropF if an only if the following relation hods: if F
satisfies RPropF for every profile in the resolute domain restriction SF,
then F satisfies IPropF for every profile in SF.
4.3.2 Unanimity preservation
We begin with the property of unanimity preservation. Typically, there
is always more than one way to generalise a resolute aggregator prop-
erty into an irresolute one. The two most intuitive generalisations of
the resolute unanimity preservation property are to require that the
unanimously supported judgment is in all of the collective judgment
sets, which we call the strong unanimity principle or to require that this
judgment is in at least one of the collective judgment sets, which we call
the weak unanimity principle. We give an example from [14].
Example 21. Consider the pre-agenda A+ = {p,p → (q∨ r),q, r,p →
(s∨ t), s, t,p → (u∨ v),u, v} with constraitns Γ = {>}. Consider the
profile P given in Table 18. The collective judgment sets of mcc(P) and
ra(P) are indicated bellow the profile in Table 18 as well.
There is one unanimously supported judgment in P, that is the judg-
ment p. Observe that this judgment is in any of judgment set in
mcc(P), which for this profile is just one set, but it is included in ev-
ery judgment set in ra(P). The collective judgment sets mc(P) for this
8 Recall that P∗(J(A, Γ)) denotes the power set of J(A, Γ) excluding the empty set.
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Agents p p→ (q∨ r) q r p→ (s∨ t) s t p→ (u∨ v) u v
Γ = {>}
J1 + + + - + + - + + -
J2 + + - + + - + + - +
J3 + - - - - - - - - -
m(P) + + - - + - - + - -
mcc - + - - + - - + - -
ra + + + + + + + + + +
+ + + - + + - + + -
+ + + - + + - + - +
+ + + - + - + + + -
+ + + - + - + + - +
+ + - + + + - + + -
+ + - + + + - + - +
+ + - + + - + + + -
+ + - + + - + + - +
+ - - - - - - - - -Table 18: A profile showing how various aggregators "behave" with respect to
the unanimity principle.
particular profile, are such that mc(P) = mcc(P) ∪ ra(P), so the unan-
imously supported judgment is in at least one collective judgment set
among the judgment sets mc(P).
We give the formal definitions of weak and strong unanimity prin-
ciple that differ only on how many of the collective judgment sets for
a profile must contain the unanimously supported judgment, if such a
judgment exists in the profile.
weak unanimity principle. An aggregator F satisfies the weak
unanimity principle when for every P ∈ J(A, Γ) and any ϕ ∈ A: if
ϕ ∈ Ji for all Ji ∈ P, then there exists at least one J ∈ F(P) such that
ϕ ∈ J.
strong unanimity principle An aggregator F satisfies the weak
unanimity principle when for every P ∈ J(A, Γ) and any ϕ ∈ A: if
ϕ ∈ Ji for all Ji ∈ P, then for every J ∈ F(P) such that ϕ ∈ J.
It is obvious that if an aggregator F satisfies the strong unanimity
principle, it will also necessarily satisfy the weak unanimity princi-
ple. The reverse does not holds. If F satisfies either the weak or the
strong unanimity principle, then it will also satisfy the resolute una-
nimity principle for every profile from the resolute domain restriction
SF ⊆ J(A, Γ).
The strong and weak unanimity principles were defined in [44, 55].
In Figure 5, we give the known results regarding which aggregators
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satisfy or fail to satisfy the unanimity principles. These results were
given in [14], where proofs for each result are given. Figure 5 con-
tains the overview of which aggregators satisfy which of the rest of
the irresolute aggregator properties we introduce.
4.3.3 Monotonicity
Monotonicity as a property for irresolute aggregators was first consid-
ered in [14] that generalises the resolute issue monotonicity defined in
[64]. Intuitively, irresolute monotonicity "guarantees" that if a judg-
ment is in all collective judgment sets for a profile, then it should
remain to be so when the support for that judgment increases in the
profile ceteris paribus. The intuition behind the desirability of the mono-
tonicity property does not change - no judgment’s selection as collec-
tive should be hurt by increased support.
We already gave four definitions of resolute monotonicity and each
of them can be generalised into an irresolute aggregator property. The
one generalised in [14] is the issue monotonicity and it is but one way
in which to issue monotonicity could be generalised. The requirements
of this generalisation are as follows. For a pair of profiles in which one
is the ϕ-strengthening of the other, if ϕ is in all collective judgments
for the profile, it should be in all the collective judgment sets of that
profile’s ϕ-strengthening.
The ceteris paribus notion is captured by considering profiles in which
one is a ϕ-strengthening of the other, as defined in Section 4.2.2. We
give the formal definition.
An aggregator F satisfies (irresolute) monotonicity if and only of for
every profile P ∈ J(A, Γ)n and every profile P ′ that is anϕ-strengthening
of P for some ϕ ∈ A it holds: if ϕ ∈ J for every J ∈ F(P), then ϕ ∈ J ′
for every J ′ ∈ F(P ′).
It can be directly observed that if an aggregator satisfies irresolute
monotonicity, then it will satisfy issue monotonicity on the resolute
domain restriction for that aggregator. Of course, one can define a
monotonicity property requiring that for the pair of profiles, if ϕ is in
at least one of the collective judgment sets for the first profile, it should
also be in at least one of the collective judgment sets for that profiles
ϕ-strengthening, but to really capture monotonicity under such a defi-
nition perhaps it would better to require that the number of collective
judgment sets containing ϕ does not decrease. Both of these versions
of monotonicity would be weaker, i.e., implied by the monotonicity
property defined in [14].
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4.3.4 Independence properties
The independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) has been criticised
as being somewhat unnatural for judgment aggregation [69] because
it effectively requires that the aggregations of judgments are issue by
issue and do not inter-influence each-other, but since the issues in the
agenda are logically related, this effectively also means disregarding
the logic relations among the issues. The weakening of the IIA require-
ment that respects the logic relations among issues was defined only
recently in [30] and it is called agenda separability.
agenda separability Recall that among the agenda properties we
presented in Section 2.1.3, we considered independent partitions and
syntactical independent partitions of an agenda, which were two ways
to express that the agenda can be split into two groups of issues that
are logically independent. Intuitively under agenda separability we
would require that judgments on one group of issues do not influence
the collective judgments selection on another group of issues, but only
when the first group is not logically related to the second and not
indiscriminately as was the case under IIA. Another way to look at the
intuition behind agenda separability is to consider two agendas A1
and A2 who can be considered independent partitions of their union.
Aggregating the profiles of such two agendas separately, or "lumped
together" as one profile for A1 ∪A2, should not matter. Observe that,
if A has two independed partitions A1 and A2, then necessarily Γ can
also be partitioned into two, possibly empty, sets of formulas Γ1 and
Γ2 that do not share variables.
Example 22. Consider the following judgment aggregation problem,
given in [61]. Party goers need to choose one drink and one snack. The
options are between beer (b) and champagne (c) for drinks, and potato
crisps (p) and caviar (k) for snacks. The agenda and constraints9 are
A = {b,¬b, c,¬c,p,¬p,k,¬k} and Γ = {b Y c,k Y p} respectively. The
profile as given in Table 19.
This agenda A can be partitioned into two independent partitions
A1 = {b,¬b, c,¬c} and A2 = {p,¬p,k,¬k}; intuitively, these are the
drink part and the snack part. We have that J(A1, Γ) = {{b,¬c}, {¬b, c}}
and J(A2, Γ) = {{p,¬k}, {¬p,k}}. The union of any set from J(A1, Γ)
with any set from J(A2, Γ) is consistent.
9 The operator Y is the logic operator exclusive or, defined asϕ1 Yϕ2 ≡ (ϕ1∧¬ϕ2)∨
(¬ϕ1∧ϕ2), namely either ϕ1 is true or ϕ2 is true but they cannot both be true nor
they can both be false at the same time.
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Agents b c p k
Γ = {b Y c,k Y p}
J1 − J11 + - + -
J12 − J21 - + - +
J22 − J23 + - - +
m(P) + - - +Table 19: An example of an agenda that has independent partitions.
We give the formal definition. An aggregator F satisfies agenda sep-
arability if and only if for all independent partitions A1 and A2 of an
agenda A , and all profiles P ∈ J(A, Γ)n, we have
F(P) = {J1 ∪ J2 | J1 ∈ F(PA1) and J2 ∈ F(PA2)}. (21)
We give an example of an aggregator, that does not satisfy agenda
separability.
Example 23. Consider the judgment aggregation problem and aggrega-
tor y from Example 13. The profile is given in Table 8. For this profile
and the aggregator y we obtain that
y(P) = ext({q,¬(p∧q)}) =
{
{¬(p∧ r), ¬(p∧ s), q, ¬(p∧ q), t},
{¬(p∧ r), ¬(p∧ s), q, ¬(p∧ q), ¬t}
}
.
The agenda from this problem has two independent partitions A1 =
{p∧ r,¬(p∧ r),p∧ s,¬(p∧ s),q,¬q,p∧ q,¬(p∧ q)} and A2 = {t,¬t}.
Table 20 gives the profiles P↓A1 (top side) and P↓A2 (bottom side)
and respective aggregations with the y aggregator. Since the profile
P↓A2 is majority-consistent, we cannot obtain the set {¬(p∧ r),¬(p∧
s),q,¬(p∧ q),¬t} from a union of a J1 ∈ y(P↓A1) and a J2 ∈ y(P↓A2).
Agents { p∧ r, p∧ s, q, p∧ q}
Γ = {>}
J1 − J6 + + + +
J7 − J10 + + - -
J11 − J17 - - + -
y(P↓A1) + -
Agents t
Γ = {>}
J1 − J6 +
J7 − J10 +
J11 − J17 -
y(P↓A2) +Table 20: Profiles P↓A1 and P↓A2 exemplifying that y does not satisfy agenda
separability.
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Agenda separability is an irresolute aggregator property and it is
not a generalisation of IIA in the same sense as the monotonicity and
unanimity properties we already considered. In [30] it was shown that
if an aggregator satisfies IIA for every profile on the resolute domain
restriction, then it will also satisfy agenda separability.
Agenda separability ensures a mild protections from manipulability
agains an agenda setter: if an aggregator satisfies it, an agenda setter
cannot manipulate the results of the aggregation by adding "unrelated"
issues to the agenda. As we see in the Example 23, under the y aggre-
gator, an agenda setter that does not want a decision made on the
truth-state of on issue, although a clear majority is of the opinion that
the issue should be answered "yes", can accomplish this by appending
this issue to an existing agenda.
overlapping agenda separability A stronger independence prop-
erty is considered in [30], called overlapping agenda separability satisfied
only (as far as we know) by two aggregators: mc and ra.
Some agendas cannot be partitioned into independent partitions,
but their level of mutual logical entrenchment is "localised". The agenda
property of having independent overlapping decompositions was defined
in [30] to capture this concept. Intuitively, an agenda A has indepen-
dent overlapping decompositions A1 and A2 such that, if A1 ∩A2 is
removed from both A1 and A2, the issues in the resulting sub-agendas
are no longer logically dependent on each other. We give the formal
definition from [30].
Let A be an agenda and let A = A1 ∪A2 (but not necessarily A1 ∩
A2 = ∅). We say that {A1,A2} is an independent overlapping decom-
position (IOD) of A if and only if for every J1 ∈ J(A1, Γ), for every
J2 ∈ J(A2, Γ)
if J1 ∩A2 = J2 ∩A1 then J1 ∪ J2 ∈ J(A, Γ). (22)
We give an example of a judgment aggregation problem with an
agenda that has an independent overlapping decomposition. The ex-
ample is also from [30].
Example 24. Consider the pre-agendaA+ = {p,p→ q,p→ r,q, r, s, s→
q, s→ r} and Γ = {>}. This agenda A has an independent overlapping
decomposition. The pre-agendas of the decompositions are:
A+1 = {p,p→ q,p→ r,q, r},
A+2 = {q, r, s, s→ q, s→ r}.
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Observe that, whenever a judgment set from J(A1, Γ) has the same
judgments on issues q and r as a judgment set from J(A2, Γ), their
union will be a consistent and complete judgment set from J(A, Γ).
An aggregator F satisfies overlapping agenda separability when the
aggregating the two profile P↓A1 and P↓A2 separately or together gives
the same results, as long as the collective judgments on the issues from
A1 ∩A2 are the same in every judgment set in F(P↓A1) and in F(P↓A2).
We give the formal definition from [30].
An aggregator F satisfies overlapping agenda separability (OAS) if and
only if for every agenda A and every independent overlapping decom-
position {A1,A2} of A, for every profile P over A it holds that:
if for every J1 ∈ F(P↓A1), for every J2 ∈ F(P↓A2) : J1 ∩A2 = J2 ∩A1
then F(P) = {J1 ∪ J2 | J1 ∈ F(P↓A1) and J2 ∈ F(P↓A2)}.
(23)
The desirability of the overlapping agenda separability property (OAS)
is not quite as straightforward as with agenda separability. OAS is
related to the idea of forgetting in knowledge representation and rea-
soning, see for example [70]. Aggregators that satisfy OAS have a
certain robustness. Say a judgment aggregation problem is aggregated
and afterwards it was shown that not all issues in the agenda need
collective judgments assigned to them. If these now irrelevant issues
are an independent overlapping decomposition of the agenda, then
the aggregation results on the issues for which we still need collective
judgments, are still valid. They would be the same if the partial profile
only on these issues is aggregated separately.
4.3.5 Reinforcement and Homogeneity
The last two irresolute aggregator properties we consider might was
well have been defined for resolute aggregators. These properties
are of relevance in preference aggregation and voting theory studies,
where they are used to attain characterisation results for aggregators,
however, in judgment aggregation they were not considered until [14]
and [61]. An intuitive way to look at reinforcement and homogeneity
is as properties concerned with "horizontally partitioning the profile",
whereas agenda separability and unanimity can be seen as properties
concerned with "vertically partitioning the profile".
reinforcement. If when aggregating two profiles on the same agenda
and constraints, some of the collective judgment for the first profile are
the same as some of the collective judgment sets of the second profile,
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then if we combine the two profiles, these "shared" judgment sets is
what we should obtain as collective. An aggregator that ensures this
property is satisfied is said to satisfy reinforcement.
Recall the definition of P1+P2 operator from Section 2.1.2: The sum
of profiles P1 and P2 where P1 ∈ J(A, Γ)n1 , P1 = (J1, . . . , Jn1) and
P2 ∈ J(A, Γ)n2 , P2 = (J ′1, . . . , J ′n2) is a profile P = P1 + P2, such that
P ∈ J(A, Γ)n, where n = n1 +n2 and P = (J1, . . . , Jn1 , J ′1, . . . , J ′n2).
Formally, an aggregator F satisfies reinforcement if for any two pro-
files P1 ∈ J(A, Γ)n1 and P1 = (J1, . . . , Jn1) such that10 P1 u P2 = ∅, it
holds that F(P1 + P2) = F(P1)∩ F(P2).
homogeneity The homogeneity property is somewhat a special case
of the reinforcement property. Instead of any two profiles being com-
bined, we consider profiles containing the same judgment sets being
added several times and how does this affect the aggregation results.
An aggregator that satisfies homogeneity should not change the collec-
tive judgment sets assigned to a profile regardless of how many times
the profile is duplicated. We give the formal definition.
Let us denote with kP = P+ · · ·+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
. An aggregator F satisfies homo-
geneity if and only if for every P ∈ J(A, Γ)n it holds F(kP) = F(P).
It is not difficult to observe that if an aggregator satisfies reinforce-
ment, then it will satisfy homogeneity. The reverse does not hold.
4.3.6 Overview of aggregator-property satisfaction
We now give an overview of what is known in the literature regarding
which aggregator satisfies which properties. The results are given in
Figure 5. The "?" in a cell denotes that no result is as of yet known,
"yes" clearly denotes that he aggregator satisfies the property, while
"no" denotes that the aggregator does not satisfy the property. All ag-
gregators satisfy anonymity. The results are from [30] regarding the
agenda separability properties and from [14] regarding almost all else.
The results regarding leximax and the agenda separability properties
follow from the property of leximax ⊆ ra, namely that leximax re-
fines ra, and ra satisfying both of these separability properties.
Furthermore, we know from [61] that the whole class of binomial
rules satisfies reinforcement, and consequently homogeneity, but fails
majority-preservation. We do not know anything about the specific
aggregators from this class satisfying the rest of the properties. The
whole class of distance-based aggregators, as well as the whole class of
10 The profiles do not share agents but of course some judgment sets may be included in
both, as different agents may have selected the same judgment set.
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Property mc mcc ra leximax med fullH y F
dG,Σ FdH ,max Frev
Majority Preservation yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no no no
Weak Unanimity yes no yes yes no no yes no no no
Strong Unanimity no no yes yes no no yes no no no
Monotonicity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no
Homogeneity yes yes yes yes yes no no yes yes yes
Reinforcement no no no no yes no no yes no yes
Agenda Separability yes yes yes yes yes yes no ? no yes
OAS yes no yes yes no no no ? no no
Figure 5: Known results and gaps of aggregators properties satisfaction.
scoring aggregators clearly fails majority-preservation as well. We also
know from [14] that the whole class of scoring aggregators satisfies
reinforcement, and hence homogeneity. The class of distance-based
aggregators Fd,max satisfies homogeneity.
relations with other aggregation methods 73
5 relations with other aggregation meth-ods
Judgment aggregation is closely related to preference aggregation, and
voting, as well as with belief merging. Out goal in this section is clarify
the relations in order to make clear for which problems which aggre-
gation theory is best suited. Judgment aggregation generalises pref-
erence aggregation. That means that a preference aggregation prob-
lem can be represented as a judgment aggregation problem. The re-
lation with belief merging is not straight forward. Both theories are
concerned with aggregating truth values of formulas, however under
belief merging there is no agenda.
5.1 Preference aggregation
Preference aggregation problems are the problems of choosing one
option by aggregating individual preferences over a collection of avail-
able options. The agents whose preferences are aggregated are also
called voters and the act of casting individual choices is known as vot-
ing. The options are also called alternatives or candidates. The term
candidates comes from the best known application of preference ag-
gregation as a method of choosing a representative such as a president
of a country.
Preference aggregation is a much bigger research field, and much
older, in comparison to judgment aggregation. Although discussions
on how to elect a winner by voting can be traced back to antique
Greece, it has been two documents that mark the begining of study-
ing how individual choices should be aggregated in a fair way to elect
a representative winner. There two documents are the "Sur les Élec-
tions au Scrutin" by Jean-Charles de Borda11 published in 1781 and
the 1785 "Essai sur l’Application de l’Analyse a la Probabilite des De-
cisions Rendues a la Pluralite des Voix" by Nicolas de Condorcet12 It
was Kenneth Arrow who axiomatised the preference aggregation the-
ory and proved the basic impossibility theorems [4].
We give a basic introduction to preference aggregation theory and
show how a preference aggregation problem can be represented as a
judgment aggregation problem, as per the standard method [12]. We
11 The original text in french can be accessed here http://gerardgreco.free.fr/IMG/pdf/
MA_c_moire-Borda-1781.pdf
12 The original text in french can be accessed here http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/
bpt6k417181.
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show when a judgment aggregator generalises a preference aggregator
and give an overview of the known relations between the methods we
represented as per [71].
5.1.1 Preference aggregation problem
A preference aggregation problem is defined by a set of options and
a list of voters. The set of options, or candidates is O = {o1, . . . ,om}.
A vote is a preference order  over O that is total, strict and transitive.
An order is a total order over O if and only if all the elements of O
are ranked, it is strict if and only if for every x,y ∈ O either x  y
or y  x. An order is transitive if and only if for every x,y, z ∈ O if
x  y and y  z, then necessarily x  z. Let V(O) be the set of all total,
strict and transitive orders for O. In general, votes can also be weak
orders over V(O), when strictness is not required, however these are
not representable within a judgment aggregation framework with the
standard method.
A voter is represented with an order i∈ V(O). A profile of votes
V = (1, . . . ,n) is a collection of voters V ∈ V(O)n.
A preference aggregation problem is a pair < O,V >. A solution to a
preference aggregation problem is an order ∈ V(O) that is represen-
tative of V , we call it a collective order. A voting problem is also a pair
< O,V >, but here the solution is one option, called a winner from O
instead of a preference order over O. Here, we will be concerned with
voting problems. Clearly, every voting problem can be represented as
a preference aggregation problem, with the winner being the undom-
inated alternative in the collective order. To determine that collective
order one applies a voting function, or a vote aggregator, to the profile
of votes V . A vote aggregator R assigns a nonempty set of options
from O to a profile of votes R : S → P∗(O), where S ⊆ V(O)n. As in
judgment aggregation, R is resolute if and only if for every V ∈ S, R(V)
is a singleton, and R satisfies universal domain if S = V(O)n.
We give two examples of voting aggregators: the Condorcet method
and the Borda method. We choose to present these two because the
are the most well known and studied methods in the social choice
literature.
5.1.2 The Condorcet method and the Borda method
An example of a vote aggregator that does not satisfy universal domain
is the Codorcet method. The Condorcet method considers all pairs of
options x,y ∈ O. The winner, called a Condorcet winner, is the option
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for which there is a majority that ranks it higher than every other
option in O. This method is easier to understand with an example.
Example 25. Consider the set of options O = {a,b, c,d} and a five agents
profile:
V1 =

a 1 c 1 d 1 b,
b 2 c 2 d 2 a,
d 3 a 3 c 3 b,
a 4 b 4 d 3 c,
d 5 a 5 c 5 b

If we look at pairwise comparisons we obtain the following numbers.
• For option a we obtain that:
– 3 agents voted a  b and 2 agents voted b  a.
– 4 agents voted a  c and 1 agent voted c  a.
– 2 agents voted a  d and 3 agents voted d  a.
• For option b we obtain that:
– 2 agents voted b  a and 3 agents voted a  b.
– 2 agents voted b  c and 3 agents voted c  b.
– 2 agents voted b  d and 3 agents voted d  b.
• For option c we obtain that:
– 1 agents voted c  a and 4 agents voted a  c.
– 3 agent voted c  b and 2 agents voted b  c.
– 2 agents voted c  d and 3 agents voted d  c.
• For option d we obtain that:
– 3 agents voted d  a and 2 agents voted a  d.
– 3 agents voted d  b and 2 agents voted b  d.
– 3 agents voted a  d and 2 agents voted c  d.
We see that for option d and only for option d there is a majority of
agents that ranks it higher than each of the other alternatives a, b and
c. Therefore d is the Condorcet winner.
The Condorcet method does not satisfy universal domain because
there exist profiles that do not have a Condorcet winner. The profile
that does not have a Condorcet winner, has a Condorcet cycle. We illus-
trate this case with an example.
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Example 26. Consider a set of options O = a,b, c and a three agent
profile:
V2 =
 a 1 b 1 c,b 2 c 2 a,
c 3 a 3 b

In this profile we have 2 agents preferring a to b and 1 agent pre-
ferring a to c. For b we have 2 agents preferring b to c and 1 agent
preferring b to a. The alternative c does not have a pairwise majority
either: there are two agents who prefer c to a, but only one agent that
prefers c to b. So none of the alternatives is the Condorcet winner. To
understand why this phenomena is called a (Condorcet) cycle we need
to draw what is known as the profile’s majority graph.
a
b c
a
b c
d
Figure 6: Majority graph for profile V2 (left-hand side) and profile V1 from
Example 25 (right-hand side).
The majority graph is a graph in which the set of nodes is the set of
options O, and there exists a directed edge from x ∈ O to y ∈ O if and
only if there is a majority of agents in V who prefer x to y. So for this
V2 we obtain the majority graph given on the left-hand side in Figure 6.
Observe that each one of the options has both incoming and outgoing
edges. In contrast, consider the majority graph for the profile V1 from
Example 25 given on the right-hand side in Figure 6. The profile V1
has a Condorcet winner, the option d. Observe how in the majority-
graph, option d has no incoming edges. This is a characteristic of the
Condorcet winner: an option is a Condorcet winner for a profile V if
and only if that option has no incoming edges in the majority graph of
profile V .
Since the Condorcet winner has to "defeat" every other option in a
pairwise comparison, it follows that when a profile has a Condorcet
winner, this winner is unique. Therefore the Condorcet winner is a
resolute vote aggregator. A vote profile that has a Condorcet winner is
called Condorcet consistent. A vote aggregator is Condorcet-preserving
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if and only if it selects the Condorcet winner and nothing but the Con-
dorcet winner when the profile aggregated has one. We can already
intimate that there is a connection between Condorcet consistency in
voting and majority consistency in judgment aggregation. Such a rela-
tion does exist and we discuss it in Section 5.1.4.
The second voting method we consider, which historically proceeds
the Condorcet method, is the Borda method. The Borda method is
an example of a vote aggregator that is irresolute and not Condorcet-
preserving. Under the Borda method we assign scores to each option
in O based on its position with respect to the other options in a vote
i. Assume that there are m options in O, i.e., |O| = m. The highest
ranked option in i gets a score of m− 1, the second highest ranked
gets the score of m− 2 and so on, with the last ranked option getting
the score of 0. The scores of an option from each voter are summed up,
and the option with the highest score is the Borda winner. We illustrate
the Borda method with an example.
Example 27. Consider the set of options O and the profile V1 from
Example 25. The Borda scores from each of the votes for each of the
options are given in Table 21.
a b c d
1 3 0 2 1
2 0 3 2 1
3 2 0 1 3
4 3 2 0 1
5 2 0 1 3∑
10 5 6 9Table 21: Borda scores for the profile V1 from Example 25.
As we can observe in the last row of the Table 21, the option with
the highest Borda score, 10, is the option a. Recall that this profile
does have a Condorcet winner, option d, thus the Borda method is not
Condorcet-preserving.
We now show how a voting problem can be represented as a judg-
ment aggregation problem.
5.1.3 Voting problems as judgment aggregation problems
To gain an intuition of how a voting problem can be represented as
a judgment aggregation problem recall how in the Condorcet method
we did not work with the total preference orders over the entire set O,
but compared the options pair by pair, or pairwise. We can represent
the set O as a set of ranked pairs of options, instead. So O = {a,b, c}
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would become {a  b,a  c,b  c}. Instead of creating a preference or-
der over O, each agent can express their preferences by saying whether
she agrees or not that a  b, that a  c and that b  c. Changing the
elicitation and expression of information in this way, does not influ-
ence how much information is contained in the set of options and in
each vote. Now observe that a  b is nothing but a proposition, to
which an agent assigns a truth-value.
We use a special propositional variable pxy to denote "option x is
preferred to option y", or "option x is ranked higher than to option
y". Given a set of options O = {o1, . . . om} we build the preference pre-
agenda A+O as
A+O = {poioj | oi,oj ∈ O and i > j}. (24)
By requiring that i > j in (24), we avoid having both pxy and pyx
in the pre-agenda. We want this because in the agenda we will have
¬pxy which has the same meaning as pyx.
Example 28. For O = {a,b, c,d} we obtain AO = {pab,¬pab,
pac,¬pac,pad,¬pad,pbc,¬pbc,pbd,¬pbd,pcd,¬pcd}.
A total, strict and transitive order  over O corresponds to a judg-
ment set J when:
• x i y if and only if pxy ∈ Ji,
• J is complete for AO,
• J is consistent for
Γ = Tr = {(pxy ∧ pyz →) | x,y, z ∈ O}. (25)
" The last condition is the transitivity constraint, ensuring that the tran-
sitivity of the "translated" preference order is preserved. The second
condition ensures that the "translated" preference order is still total
and strict. Hence, every profile of votes V ∈ V(O) for a set of options
O has a corresponding profile of judgments P ∈ J(AO, Tr).
Sometimes in voting, the agents are required to give preference or-
ders that are not necessarily complete, nor transitive and strict, but in
which a top preferred option exists. To capture those votes in judg-
ment aggregation, we need a weaker constraint than Tr. The W or
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winner constraint describes that there exist one option that in undomi-
nated, for that is preferred to any other option:
W = {
∨
oi∈O
∧
oj∈O
i 6=j
poioj }. (26)
We include and example from [71] to illustrate the difference be-
tween the Tr and W constraints.
Example 29. Consider O = {a,b, c,d, e} and a judgment set for AO
J = {pab,pac,pbc,pdb,pce,peb}.
J does not satisfy the Tr constraint because pbc ∧ pce ∧ peb vi-
olates (pbc ∧ pce)→ pbe. But an undominated option does exist,
the option a, so J satisfies the W constraint.
5.1.4 Majority consistency an Condorcet consistency
There is a connection between the Condorcet winners of a vote profile
V , when they exist, and the elements of m(P), where P is a judgment
profile corresponding to V . To observe this, we go back to the majority
graph. There is an edge from option x to option y in the majority
graph for V if and only if there is a majority in V that consider x  y.
But there is a majority in V that ranks x higher than y if and only if
there is a majority of agents that selected pxy in their judgment sets
in the judgment profile P that corresponds to the vote profile V . But
then, by definition pxy ∈ m(P). Thus we can observe that is an edge
from option x to option y in the majority graph for V if and only if
pxy ∈ m(P).
Next observe that there is a Condorcet winner for V ∈ V(O)n if
and only if the corresponding P ∈ J(AO, Tr)n is a majority consistent
profile. If there is no Condorcet winner, the majority graph has no
option that has only incoming edges, therefore at least one cycle must
exist in graph. Note that there is a cycle between three options if and
only if transitivity fails. For example if there is a majority for which
a  b and there is a majority for which b  c and there is a majority
for which c  a, then (pab∧pbc)→ pac is violated and the m(P)
will not be consistent.
Next we present the definition from [71] regarding when a vote ag-
gregator is generalised by a judgment aggregator.
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5.1.5 Vote aggregators and judgment aggregators
We have shown how to represent a voting problem with a judgment
aggregation problem, but how to determiner the winners from the
collective judgment sets?
The Condorcet winner of V will be one of the elements of the m(P),
where P is the corresponding judgment profile to the voting profile V ,
it will be the x ∈ O that always occurs on either the left side of the
poioj or on the right side of ¬poioj . This is the undominated option
and it is the winner in a collective judgment set selected by a judgment
aggregator.
We define the winners of a collective judgment set J ∈ F(P) for P ∈
J(AO, Γ)n:
Winner(J) = {x | pyx 6∈ J for any y ∈ O,y 6= x}. (27)
Now we can define when a judgment aggregator generalises a vote
aggregator, as in [71]: when a judgment aggregator always assigns
judgment sets to a profile P that have the same winners as a vote
aggregator would assign to a corresponding vote profile V . Formally
F generalises R if and only if for every P ∈ J(AO, Γ)n, Γ ∈ {Tr, W} that
corresponds to a vote profile V ∈ V(O)n it holds
R(V) = {x | x ∈Winner(J), J ∈ F(P)}. (28)
Figure 7 summarises the relations between voting aggregators and
judgment aggregators investigated in [71]. The proofs as well as def-
initions for the vote aggregators can be found in [71]. Furthermore,
it is shown [26] that Frev generalises the Borda method under the Tr
constraint.
mc mcc med ra y Frev
Tr Top Cycle Slater Kemeny Ranked Pairs Young Borda method
W Copeland Maximin
Figure 7: Generalisation results between vote aggregators and judgment ag-
gregators from [71].
The judgment representation of an aggregation problem is less suc-
cinct than the preference aggregation. It is easy to see that if |O| = m,
then |AO| = (m − 1) ·m, i.e., twice (one for the positive one for the
negative formula) the number of combinations of 2 elements from m
elements without repetition.
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5.2 Belief Merging
Belief merging is a knowledge representation discipline concerned with
aggregating or merging several sets of formulas into one consistent set
[72]. Judgment aggregation is concerned with aggregating sets of for-
mulas, however unlike belief merging, in judgment aggregation we
are interested in a particular set of formulas given by the agenda. We
introduce the belief merging framework and highlight the differences.
Recall that Lp is a set of well formed formulas of propositional logic.
A knowledge base K ⊂ Lp is a finite set of formulas. A profile E is a
non-empty multi-set (a bag) of knowledge bases E = {K1, . . . ,Kn}. The
set E is the set of all possible profiles. In addition to the knowledge
bases, an integrity constraint µ ∈ Lp is also defined.
Note how we did not require that a knowledge base is consistent.
In belief merging there are no issues as in judgment aggregation, one
knowledge base can have formulas that do not share formulas with
another knowledge base.
A belief merging problem is a pair 〈E,µ〉. Clearly a judgment ag-
gregation problem in the logic framework can be considered a belief
merging problem, when the agenda is omitted. We can construct an
agenda, when given a profile of knowledge bases, by including in it
every formula that occurs in a Ki in E, and its negation. However, then
Ki may be incomplete judgment sets for this agenda.
A knowledge base is consistent if and only if
∧
K is a consistent
formula of propositional logic, denoted K 2 ⊥. Let ϕi =
∧
Ki. Simi-
larly, a profile E = {K1, . . . ,Kn} is consistent if
∧
16i6n
ϕi is a consistent
formula of propositional logic. We write E 2 ⊥.
The principle object of study within belief merging are operators
that aggregated a profile of belief bases E into a belief base K that
satisfies the integrity constraint µ. A belief merging operator is defined
as ∆ : E×Lp → P(Lp). Belief merging operators are typically written
∆µ(E) instead of ∆(E,µ).
In judgment aggregation, and social choice in general, an aggregator
is first defined and then characterised by the properties that only it
satisfies. In belief merging a minimal set of properties, or postulates, is
defined such that a function is considered a belief merging operator
if and only if it satisfies these properties. We give the postulates here.
Let unionsq be the multi-set union operator: for E1 = {K1, . . . ,Kn} and E2 =
{Kn1 , . . . ,Kn}, E1 unionsq E1 = {K1, . . . ,Kn,Kn1 , . . . ,Kn}.
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(IC0) ∆µ(E) |= µ.
This postulate stipulates that the result of the merging must sat-
isfy the integrity constraints.
(IC1) If µ is consistent, then ∆µ(E) is consistent.
This postulate stipulates that the result of the merging must be a
consistent set of formulas.
(IC2) If E is consistent with µ, then ∆µ(E) ≡ E∧ µ.
This postulate stipulates that if the knowledge bases are consis-
tent with each-other, their conjunction is consistent, and consis-
tent with the integrity constraints, then merging them is just tak-
ing the conjunction of the profile with the integrity constraints.
(IC3) If E1 ≡ E2 and µ1 ≡ µ2, then ∆µ1(E1) ≡ ∆µ2(E2).
This postulate describes the desirability of the merging operator
to consistent and always aggregate the same knowledge bases
under the same constraints in the same manner.
(IC4) If K1 |= µ and K2 |= µ, then ∆µ({K1,K2})∧ K1 is consistent if
and only if ∆µ({K1,K2})∧K2 is consistent.
This postulate guarantees that no knowledge base is given pref-
erential treatment when they are consistent with the integrity
constraints.
(IC5) ∆µ(E1)∧∆µ(E2) |= ∆µ(E1 unionsq E2).
This postulate expresses the requirement that if two groups E1
and E2 agree on some formulas then these formulas will be cho-
sen if we join the two groups.
(IC6) If ∆µ(E1)∧∆µ(E2) is consistent, then ∆µ(E1 unionsq E2) |= ∆µ(E1)∧
∆µ(E2).
This postulate is the second direction of postulate (IC5). To-
gether these two postulate stipulate that if two groups agree on at
least one formula (that it is true), then the result of merging two
groups is precisely the set of formulas on which they al agree.
(IC7) ∆µ1(E)∧ µ2 |= ∆µ1∧µ2(E).
This postulate guarantees that if a profile merged under con-
straint µ1 is consistent with constraint µ2, then the result of this
merge is the same as merging the profile under both constraints.
(IC7) If ∆µ1(E)∧ µ2 is consistent, then ∆µ1∧µ2(E) |= ∆µ1(E).
This postulate is the second direction of the previous one. To-
gether they act as a kind of reasoning monotonicity property.
They guarantee that if a formula is among the results of the
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merge, this formula is consistent with a second integrity con-
straint, and then the profile is aggregated by a stronger con-
straint, the formula will still be a result of the merge.
Everare em et al. [73] show a correspondence between belief merg-
ing postulates and properties of judgment aggregator. Thus the pos-
tulate (IC0) is the requirement that the collective judgment sets are
consistent, which is satisfied by construction of the judgment aggrega-
tors. Satisfying (IC1) corresponds to satisfying the universal domain
property.
Postulate (IC2) corresponds to a judgment aggregator property de-
fined in [73] and called consensuality. A judgment profile P is consen-
sual if and only if there exists at least one judgment ϕ ∈ A that is
unanimously supported in P. A judgment aggregator satisfies consen-
suality if and only if for every consensual profile on some ϕ ∈ A, we
have that ϕ ∈ J for every J ∈ F(P). Quite obviously, the consensuality
property is the same as the strong unanimity principle we defined in
Section 4.3.2, introduced in [44, 55].
Postulate (IC3) corresponds to the judgment aggregator property
anonymity, while postulates (IC4) resembles a neutrality property, but
it is not quite the same. This postulate requires a new judgment ag-
gregator property to capture it. Intuitively, we can expect that this
property would not be satisfied by many of the judgment aggregators
we introduced, in particular those from the class of distance-based ag-
gregators.
Postulates (IC5) and (IC6) correspond to the reinforcement judgment
aggregator property, defined as consistency in [73].
Lastly postulates (IC7) and (IC8) also do not correspond to any of
the judgment aggregator properties. Two new properties are defined
in [73] to capture (IC7) and (IC8) in judgment aggregation, called Sen’s
property α and Sen’s property β respectively. These properties describe
what should happen if some issues are added or removed from the
agenda. We give the definitions of these properties in our framework.
sen’s property α. Consider P ∈ J(A, Γ)n and consider agenda A ′
such that A ′ ⊂ A. An aggregator F satisfies Sen’s property α if and
only if for any ϕ ∈ A ′, if ϕ ∈ J for every J ∈ F(P), then ϕ ∈ J ′ for every
J ′ ∈ F(P↓A ′).
sen’s property β. Consider P ∈ J(A, Γ)n and consider agenda A ′
such that A ′ ⊂ A. An aggregator F satisfies Sen’s property β if and
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only if for any ϕ1,ϕ2 ∈ A ′ such that {ϕ1,ϕ2} ⊆ J for every J ∈ F(P↓A ′)
it holds that ϕ1 ∈ J if and only if ϕ2 ∈ J for every J ∈ F(P).
Although reminiscent of the agenda separability properties, the Sen’s
properties have not been previously considered in judgment aggrega-
tion and they are obviously more demanding then agenda separability
properties. This impression is also echoed in [73] where it is argued
that the Sen’s properties are undesirable since they do not take into
consider logical relations between the issues in the agenda.
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6 aggregation problems in mas
In this section we give an overview of different types of collective
decision-making problems in multi agent systems that can be mod-
elled with judgment aggregation, and those that probably should not.
We discern between problems based on where the judgment sets are
coming from and what type of issues are in the agenda. We associate
different types of problems with different aggregator properties. Judg-
ment aggregation has been used to decide collective goals based on
collectively supported beliefs [74, 75], as a method to aggregate argu-
ments [20, 21], it has been considered as a method to aggregate graphs
[76], and as a tool for determining collective annotations [77]. Here we
give a more general categorisation of problems that can be handled by
judgment aggregation. What is perhaps best illustrated in this section
is that research in judgment aggregation has so far apparently opened
more problems than it has solved, including the problem of designing
efficient judgment aggregators remaining open.
6.1 When to use judgment aggregation?
Judgment aggregation is a good tool to model complex collective decision-
making problems. We use the word "complex" to denote problems in
which multiple interdependent decisions have to be made at the same
time on issues that are of different epistemic types, e.g.,
preferences, estimates, goals, beliefs, etc. It is best suited for decision
problems in which we need a decision on the truth state of multiple
issues.
If we know precisely for which issues we need a truth state de-
cision, and perhaps what constraint those truth-states should satisfy,
then these are the issues that will form the agenda and the constraints
respectively. If we are interested in what is true for several different
sources of information, without having questions on which we are
looking for answers, then it is better to use belief merging.
We showed that preferences can be aggregated as judgments, how-
ever we also showed that representing the preferences as orders over
options if far more efficient than representing the aggregation problem
with judgments and transitivity constraints. Therefore, for choosing
one option from a set of options, based on input from various agents,
it is best to use voting or preference aggregation directly. An excep-
tion is the case when the options are not independent and choosing
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one option can imply choosing or excluding other options. We discuss
this special case in the next section.
6.2 Types of agenda issues
The agenda in judgment aggregation is defined as a set of proposi-
tional logic formulas. This a very abstract way of representing issues.
On one hand this abstraction allows decision problems involving many
different kinds of issues to be modelled in the judgment aggregation
framework. In contrast, preference aggregation models only prefer-
ences between options. An issue ϕ can model "option a is better than
option b, which expresses preference, or ϕ can model "the value of
the British pound in January 2017 will be lower than the value of the
British pound in January 2016", expressing a value judgment.
Although this information on the epistemic nature of issues is lost
in the agenda representation, it must be recaptured by the properties
of the judgment aggregator. Thus, for example, when aggregating
preferences one agent’s preference should influence the selection of
collective judgment sets as much as every other agent’s preferences,
thus requiring that the aggregator is anonymous. In contrast, some
agents may be better at giving value judgments than others, and the
aggregator should give these agents more influence on deciding the
collective judgment sets.
We consider various types of agenda issues that can be encountered
and suggest when appropriate aggregator properties that should be
satisfies when aggregating judgments on these issues.
6.2.1 Subjective judgments
Votes are best aggregated by vote aggregators or preference aggrega-
tors, but that approach holds best when we need to choose one from a
set of options. There are natural problems in which we need to chose a
combination of options, with certain combinations being feasible and
others not, due to resource limitations for example. This problem is
known as combinatorial voting [2, Chapter 9]. We illustrate it with an
example.
Example 30. We need to select a meal to be served at a banquette. The
meal consists of a starter, main course and desert. the caterer provides
a list of options for staters OS, mains OM and desert OD and all par-
ticipants make their preference, but they may only choose one of each.
We have a combinatorial set of options in this problem OS×OM×OD,
called a combinatorial domain. Assume OS = {a,b, c}, OM = {x,y},
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OD = {α,β,γ}, then the agents need to select one from options O =
{(a, x,α), (a, x,β), (a, x,γ),
(a,y,α), (a,y,β), (a,y,γ), (b, x,α), (b, x,β), (b, x,γ), (b,y,α), (b,y,β),
(b,y,γ), (c, x,α), (c, x,β), (c, x,γ), (c,y,α), (c,y,β), (c,y,γ)}.
We can model this problem as a judgment aggregation problem. We
can form an agenda such that A+ = {po | p ∈ OS ∪ OM ∪ OD}, so
for each option an agent can give a judgment po to express choosing
that option and ¬po to express not choosing it. We use the constraints
Γ = {(a Y b Y c)∧ (x Y y)∧ (α Y β Y γ)} to ensure that only one of each
courses is selected.
We can easily express further limitations on what combination can
be selected by adding constraints.
Grandi considers judgment aggregation for combinatorial voting
[78].
Combinatorial voting problems can be found in many resource allo-
cation scenarios, where bundles of resources need to be allocated to a
group of agents.
We should point out that the reader should not confuse combinato-
rial voting with the only apparently similar committee voting. In com-
mittee voting there is only one set of options, but we want to select
k winners from them not only one. An example of a committee vot-
ing problem is when we need to select representatives for 160 seats in
parliament and there are 3000 candidates that are running for a seat.
More on committee voting, also known as multiwinner elections can
be found in [79].
The combinatorial voting agenda whose pre-agenda is defined for
a combinatorial domain D1 × · · · ×Dk as A+ = {po | po ∈ (D1 ∪
· · · ∪Dk)} contains only issues that express preferences, although these
issues are not of form poioj .
Epistemically, preferences are question whose true answer is subjec-
tive, meaning that there exists no one true answer for everyone, but
every agent is an authority on themselves. For example, one person
may prefer combining beer and potato chips, while another may pre-
fer beer and caviar. Even if there is a consensus that beer and caviar
are not a match, it is not wrong to make that preference, choice or
have that desire. Therefore, aggregating subjective judgments should
be done in such a way that as many of the preferences as possible are
respected. Aggregators that satisfy unanimity principles and majority-
preservation are adequate for these kinds of problems, as also argued
in [80].
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6.2.2 Value judgments
In contrast to subjective judgments, value judgments do have an objec-
tive true-state. For example proposition ϕ denoting "the weight of the
ox is 453kg" is a value judgment. Two agents may have different opin-
ions regarding whether the weight of the ox is or is not 453kg, however
only one of them can be right and this can be established objectively
by measuring the ox.
When dealing with intelligent autonomous agents, agendas with is-
sues that require value judgments can be expected to occur perhaps
more often than agendas with issues that require subjective judgments
when a group of agents needs to estimate the truth-state of various
parameters and propositions in order to make decisions about what
to do, for example. The type of collective judgment sets that we are
looking for when aggregating value judgments are different then when
aggregating subjective judgments. Here it is not so relevant how many
of the individual judgments coincide with the collective judgments,
hence unanimity preservation and majority preservation are not essen-
tial. We would ideally want selected as collective, those judgments
that have the highest probability of being the same with the objective
truth.
The property of judgment aggregators to select the collective judg-
ments with highest probability of being the objective truth is called
truth-tracking. The truth-tracking properties of judgment aggregators
is a very
under-explored area, with the exception of some work on the premise-
based, conclusion-based agenda’s and the median aggregator[81, 82,
83]. It was shown in [43], through experiments with robots, that when
the premises are propositional variables, the premised based proce-
dure is the better than the conclusion-based procedure and the median
aggregator. Further empirical and probabilistic analysis is needed to
identify the truth-tracking properties of the remaining judgment ag-
gregators.
6.2.3 Equivalence relations
A special type of an agenda issue is the equivalence relation which is
the question "Is x = y?". Some equivalence relations require subjective
judgments, for example "Is ordering in indian food the same as going
out for thai food?", other’s require value judgments, e.g., "Are these
two pictures both pictures of the Eiffel tower? ". The aggregation of
judgments on equivalences is an important problem in artificial intel-
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ligence (AI) in general since a lot of classification of equivalent objects
is at the core of many AI problems13.
The aggregation of equivalence relations was considered in [84]. An
equivalence relation is a binary predicate that is symmetric, reflexive
and transitive. Namely P is an equivalence relation if for all x,y, z it
holds that P(x, x) is true (reflexivity), if P(x,y) ↔ P(y, x) holds (sym-
metry), and (P(x,y)∧ P(y, z)) → P(x, z) holds (transitivity). Given a
set of items I we can construct an agenda AI as follows
AI = {px=y,¬px=y | x,y ∈ I, x 6= y} (29)
A judgment px=y denotes that x is equal to y, while ¬px=y denotes
that x is not equal to y. To enforce symmetry and transitivity we
construct the following set of constraints
Γ = {(px=y ∧ py=z)→ px=z | x,y, z ∈ I}∪ {(px=y ↔| x,y ∈ I}. (30)
With which kind of aggregator judgments on equivalence relations are
best aggregated would depend on whether they are value or subjective
judgments.
6.2.4 Controlled judgments
We briefly would like to make notice of a particular type of issues
that can occur in collective decision making problems among artificial
agents. Some issues are such that one agent, or one group of agents,
can force their truth-value. For example, I am the only person who can
determine whether the judgment for the issue "I can lift the book on
the desk." is true or falls. Other agents may have guesses and means
of estimating whether this issue is true or false, but I am the only one
that is an authority on its truth-state. If a group of agents are making
a collective plan to accomplish a goal, and only one of the agents is
able to execute action a, then this agent is the only one that can give a
judgment on the issue "action a is feasible".
If an agenda contains only issues that admit controlled judgments,
then there is no collective decision making problem. If however, an
agenda contains both controlled judgments and either value judgments
or subjective judgments. Aggregating the judgments in such an agenda
issue by issue does not guarantee a consistent collective judgment set.
This is the so called Liberal, or Sen’s paradox in judgment aggregation
13 Classification tasks usually would involve value judgments.
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Voters ϕ1 ϕ1 → ϕ2 ϕ2
Γ = {>}
J1 + -
J2 + -
J3 +
m(P) + + -Table 22: An example of the Liberal paradox in judgment aggregation.
[85]. We illustrate it with an example, with the same structure as to
the one in [85].
Example 31. Consider the following issues:
ϕ1: Is action a feasible?
ϕ1 → ϕ2: Is it the case that if action a is feasible, then plan p is
feasible?
ϕ2: Is plan p feasible?
Consider three agents with agent one being the authority on ϕ1
and agent two, the planner being the authority on ϕ2. We have
the agenda A = {ϕ1,¬ϕ1,ϕ1 → ϕ2,¬(ϕ1 → ϕ2),ϕ2,¬ϕ2} and
Γ = {>}. The agents give incomplete judgment sets. A profile is
given in Table 22.
Note that the Liberal paradox occurs also in judgment aggregation
problems where the judgments are of different kinds but one expert
or group of expert only is consulted in the profile and decides the
collective judgment for an issue.
It is not at all clear how agendas with controlled judgments and in
general agendas with issues that admit different types of judgment
should be handled in judgment aggregation. These agendas occur for
example when determining which goal a group to pursue based on
what beliefs the group upholds about the world, a problem modelled
as a judgment aggregation problem in [75], where it is recommended
that a two-step procedure is used. Different types of issues need to
be treated differently as argued in [86], however non-neutral aggrega-
tors, with the exception of the binomial rules of [61] have not yet been
developed.
6.3 Types of information sources
In addition to what types of judgments the issues in the agenda admit,
we must also consider how the judgment sets are formed. The intu-
itive collective decision making problem is the problem of a group of
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agent reaching an agreement of which judgments should be assigned
to which issues. In this example, the judgment sets of the profile re-
gardless of the type of the judgments, are formed by each decision
maker, in response to the issues in the agenda. The agents can be
instructed to construct full judgment sets and to the constraints associ-
ated with the agent and further more, they can consider the collective
judgment sets after they are formed and set a tie-breaking method.
However, judgment aggregation can also be used to combine infor-
mation from several information sources, like knowledge bases, user
reviews, databases etc. While the collective judgment sets are used by
many in the first case, here they are used by the agenda setter. Al-
though merging information is the domain of belief merging, if we are
only interested in only the boolean answers of specific questions, then
we should use judgment aggregation. One has to be aware however,
that, as shown in [73] aggregating the full information bases may not
give the same outcome as aggregating judgments on particular ques-
tions. It is however not reasonable to expect that every source will
be such that judgments to all issues can be extracted from it. Further-
more, it cannot be expected that every source will abide to the agenda
constraints. We illustrate this case of judgment set sources with an
example.
Example 32. Assume we are trying to decide whether to visit Sicily
in July. There are multiple reviews and travel guides online we can
consult. A rational agent would base her decision on reasons. So what
is a good reason to "visit Sicily", an issue we mark d? Here is an
example of reasons:
p1 : I have the desire to travel.
p2 : There are good beaches in Sicily.
p3 : Accommodation is affordable.
p4 : There are interesting sites to visit.
p5: Hotels are cheaper than 50 euros per night .
Clearly issue p1 admits a controlled judgment - only I can speak
of my desires. Issues p2, p3 and p4 are subjective judgments, while
issue p5 is a value judgment since it can objectively be determined
what the prices of accommodation are. The constraints would be Γ =
{
(
p1 ∧ (p2 ∨ p4)∧ p3
) ↔ d,p5 → p3} and the pre-agenda is A+ =
{d,p1,p2,p3,p4,p5}.
However, not all information sources would abide by our agenda
constraints. Some people may consider hotels cheaper than 80 euros
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per night affordable, for others, Scilly is good place to visit (judgment
d) because of completely different reasons, like good food, although
they do not think that there are good beaches or affordable accommo-
dation there.
We see from Example 32 that, since the agenda setter is the user of
the aggregated information, what matters is that her conditions are
satisfied, not that other people agree that this is a good way to make a
decision. Thus although we aggregate subjective judgments in the case
of information sources, it is not paramount to use majority-preserving
aggregators, or aggregators that satisfy the unanimity principle(s).
To handle aggregation problems as in Example 32 we need aggre-
gators that are of type F : P(A)n → P∗(J(A, Γ)), so aggregators that
assign a set of non-empty judgment sets consistent with the agenda
constraint Γ to a profile of possibly incomplete and inconsistent (with
Γ ) sets of judgments. The mc, mcc, med, y and ra aggregators can be
easily extended to become this type of aggregators.
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